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Overview 
This thesis consists of three parts. Part 1 is a systematic review of literature centred 
on the relationship between hallucinations and mental imagery. The 24 studies 
reviewed highlighted the conceptual and methodological difficulties researchers have 
faced when investigating a relationship between mental imagery and hallucinations. 
Accordingly, inconsistent findings were demonstrated in studies that investigated a 
relationship between volitional imagery and hallucinations. However, the review did 
indicate a relationship between intrusive imagery and hallucinations. The nature and 
direction of this relationship, however, still remains theoretical. Part 2 is an empirical 
paper reporting on an investigation into one particular theory regarding the 
relationship between intrusive imagery and hallucinations. Accordingly, 
hallucinations were argued to be on an extreme end of a continuum with intrusive 
imagery. A particular type of information processing (weak allocentric and intact 
egocentric) was argued to underlie this relationship. The results of the study 
demonstrated some support for this thesis but further research was recommended. 
Part 3 is a critical appraisal of both part 1 and part 2 of the thesis. It reflects on two 
underlying theoretical assumptions of the research: The continuum approach to 
psychotic experiences; and the notion of trauma as a causal factor in the development 
of psychotic symptoms. In addition, conceptual and methodological issues with 
regard to measuring both hallucinations and intrusive image were discussed.  
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Abstract 
Aims 
Despite over a century of theorising and empirical testing, the relationship between 
hallucinations and mental imagery remains unclear (Bentall, 1990). Consequently, 
this systematic review of the literature on hallucinations and mental imagery aimed 
to investigate whether a relationship exists between these two constructs, and, if so, 
what theoretical accounts can be supported.   
Method 
A systematic review of the literature was conducted on Psychinfo and Medline 
databases on research investigating the relationship between hallucinations and 
mental imagery. This search strategy yielded 24 studies to be reviewed. 
Results 
The research was divided into two broad sections: The relationship between 
volitional imagery and hallucinations and the relationship between intrusive imagery 
and hallucinations. In both clinical and non-clinical populations, the findings were 
inconsistent when investigating volitional imagery and hallucinations. A more 
positive relationship was consistently demonstrated between intrusive imagery and 
hallucinations. However, conclusions are limited due to methodological critiques. 
Conclusions 
As a result of the inconclusive nature of the research on volitional imagery and 
hallucinations, it was concluded in line with Bentall (1990) that the existing research 
does not support an association. There were more positive findings in the area of 
intrusive imagery and hallucinations. Theoretical explanations and clinical 
implications for this potential association are discussed. 
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Introduction 
Although hallucinations have been demonstrated in physical disorders (Assad & 
Shapiro, 1986), a range of psychological disorders (e.g. Brewin & Patel, 2010) and in 
the general population (e.g. Barrett & Etheridge, 1992), they have predominantly 
been reified as a primary symptom of schizophrenia. Specifically, the symptoms of 
schizophrenia as defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders IV include hallucinations, delusions and disorganised speech (APA, 1994). 
Many researchers have attempted to explain the nature of hallucinatory experiences 
(e.g. Bentall, 1990). One such theory centres on the relationship between mental 
imagery and hallucinations. However, the nature of this relationship remains unclear 
(Bentall, 1990). This review aims to investigate the relationship between 
hallucinations and mental imagery, in order to clarify the literature and highlight 
theoretical accounts that might account for this relationship. 
 
Definitions of mental imagery and hallucinations 
The construction of mental imagery has dramatically evolved since Galton (1983) 
first attempted to address the nature of the phenomenal experience. Subsequently, 
Richardson (1967) defined mental imagery as quasi-sensory and quasi-perceptual 
experiences, of which we are self-consciously aware. Following the rise of cognitive 
psychology in the 1960’s, mental imagery came to be viewed as both a phenomenal 
experience and an internal representation of perceptual objects, events or scenes 
(Richardson, 1999). As such, mental images occur in different forms, such as dreams 
and fantasies (Horowitz, 1967), or enter non-volitionally into conscious awareness 
(Horowitz, 1970). They can also possess the full range of sensory attributes, although 
the vast majority of the literature concerns visual imagery (Kosslyn, 1994).   
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With regard to a definition of hallucinations, Slade and Bentall (1988) proposed the 
following, broad definition: “Any percept-like experience, which (a) occurs in the 
absence of an appropriate stimulus, (b) has the full force or impact of the 
corresponding actual (real) perception and (c) is not amenable to direct and voluntary 
control by the experiencer” (p.23).  
 
Theories of a relationship between mental imagery and hallucinations 
One of the oldest theories proposed that individuals with particularly vivid mental 
imagery would be prone to experience hallucinations (Galton, 1883).  Indeed, in their 
formulation of hallucinations, Roman and Landis (1945) postulated that, “they might 
be thought of as mental images which become more vivid and compelling than 
ordinary imagery, but remain images nonetheless” (p. 327). Similarly, Strauss (1969) 
argued that hallucinations exist on a continuum with mental imagery.  
 
Following this line of enquiry, it has been hypothesised that hallucinations arise due 
to difficulties in discriminating between a mental image and an actual perception 
(e.g. Aleman, Bocker & de Haan, 1999). This is based on the work of Kosslyn 
(1994) who argued that mental images like hallucinations have perceptual qualities 
and can occur in the absence of sensory stimuli. In determining whether a mental 
event is externally or internally generated (i.e. a perception or an image) an 
individual compares the amount of sensory, contextual and semantic attributes of the 
item (Johnson & Raye, 1981). Therefore, it has been proposed that greater imagery 
vividness or reduced perceptual clarity may create the conditions for hallucination 
formation (Bocker et al., 2000). 
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Horowitz (1975) presented an alternative thesis that individuals prone to 
hallucinations might demonstrate an imagery deficit, causing them to misattribute 
vivid images to an external source. As such, there have been attempts to address the 
relationship between the sensory modality of both imagery and hallucinations (e.g. 
Heilbrun, Blum & Hass, 1983). 
 
Most recently, some authors have proposed theories based on a relationship between 
intrusive imagery and hallucinations. Although intrusive imagery is the hallmark of a 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) diagnosis, blurred boundaries exist between 
PTSD and other psychological disorders, especially psychosis (Mueser, 2010). This 
may be due to the high levels of trauma experienced by individuals diagnosed with 
psychosis (Read et al., 2005), as well as the phemenological similarities between 
both intrusive imagery and hallucinations. (Nayani & David, 1996). 
 
A number of theoretical accounts have been proposed to explain an association 
between intrusive imagery and hallucinations. Morrison (2001) argued that 
hallucinations represent culturally unacceptable interpretations of intrusive mental 
events. Hoffman (1986) and Hemsley (1993) postulated that hallucinations arise 
from the intrusion of unexpected material from long-term memory caused by deficits 
in temporal and spatial processing of information. Continuing an information 
processing account, Steel, Fowler and Holmes (2005) argued that hallucinations 
might arise as a result of weak encoding of contextual information. This is based on 
theoretical accounts of intrusive imagery in PTSD (Brewin, 2001). As such, intrusive 
memories from traumatic events appear into consciousness involuntarily, contain the 
sensory and emotion characteristics of the event but lack the temporal, verbal and 
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contextual information, to help make sense of the experience. They argued that these 
intrusive images form the template of hallucinatory experiences. 
 
Previous reviews 
There have been two previous reviews investigating a relationship between imagery 
and hallucinations. Bentall (1990) reviewed psychological research that has 
attempted to explain the nature of hallucinations; imagery was one aspect of this 
review.  Seal, Aleman and Mcguire (2004) reviewed only research investigating a 
relationship between auditory hallucinations and imagery. Whilst Bentall (1990) 
argued that the research was inconclusive, Seal, Aleman and Mcguire (2004) argued 
that hallucination formation is influenced by a greater role of imagery in determining 
a perception.   
 
Aims of the review 
This review is centred on the relationship between mental imagery and 
hallucinations. The aim is to summarise the evidence to help clarify the nature of this 
proposed relationship. Consequently, the current review will provide an update to 
Bentall (1990) and include studies in all sensory modalities in order to complement 
the review by Seal, Aleman and Mcguire (2004).  
 
 The current review will aim to answer the following questions:  
1. Are hallucinations related to mental imagery? 
2. If so, what theoretical accounts can explain the nature of this relationship? 
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Through answering these questions, it is hoped this will generate further areas of 
investigation in order to enhance understanding and help develop psychological 
interventions for individuals distressed by psychotic phenomena. 
 
Methodology 
A comprehensive search of the literature was conducted on both Psychinfo and 
Medline databases in order to identify published papers within the area of imagery 
and hallucinations. 
 
Search strategy 
Combinations of the following search terms were utilised: hallucinations, 
hallucination, hallucinatory, psychosis, psychotic, schizophrenia, schizotypy, 
schizotypal, imagery, intrusion, intrusions, intrusive imagery. This search strategy 
yielded 365 articles. 
 
Additional Search 
Manual searches of the references of relevant articles yielded an additional 10 
articles.  
 
Inclusion criteria 
In order to be included in the review, articles needed to meet inclusion criteria. 
Firstly, articles needed to have quantitative methodologies employing experimental 
or non-experimental designs. Secondly, articles had to be published in peer-reviewed 
journals written in the English language. Thirdly, the study designs employed 
measures that assessed both mental imagery and hallucinations. These could include 
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predisposition to hallucination or schizotypy measures, which include scales 
assessing hallucinatory experiences.  
 
Exclusion Criteria 
Articles were excluded on the basis of the following criteria: Single-case studies; 
book chapters or viewpoint articles; studies where the focus of a relationship 
between imagery and hallucinations was neurobiological; studies on PTSD (and 
other psychological disorders), whereby intrusive re-experiencing images were not 
assessed or reported in relation to hallucinatory experiences.  
 
On the basis of these inclusion and exclusion criteria, this search strategy yielded 24 
studies to be reviewed. 
 
Results - critical review 
The empirical research on imagery and hallucinations that is included in this review 
has been divided into two sub-categories (See Table 1): 
 
1. The relationship between volitional imagery and hallucinations 
1.1 Studies employing introspective measures in clinical 
populations 
1.2 Studies employing introspective measures in non-clinical   
populations 
1.3 Studies employing objective measures in clinical and non-
clinical populations 
2. The relationship between intrusive imagery and hallucinations
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Table 1 Studies investigating the relationship between mental imagery and hallucinations 
Paradigm Study Participants Methodology Findings 
Volitional imagery 
and hallucinations: 
introspective 
measures in clinical 
populations 
    
 Mintz & Alpert (1972) 20 Hal SZ 
20 Non Hal SZ 
20 Controls 
The WC task assessing 
vividness of mental 
imagery 
Hal SZ group reported 
higher rates of imagery 
vividness 
 Slade (1976) 8 Hal SZ 
8 Non Hal SZ 
16 Controls 
Imagery assessed via the 
QMI, the Gordon and 
VTE 
No difference between SZ 
groups. SZ groups 
together scored higher on 
imagery vividness than 
controls  
 Brett & Starker (1977) 20 Hal SZ 
20 Non Hal SZ 
20 General medical 
patients 
Imagery vividness 
assessed via presentation 
of cards Controllability 
assessed via the Gordon 
No differences between 
any groups on imagery 
vividness or 
controllability Hal SZ 
group less vividness on 
emotional interpersonal 
items 
 Starker & Jolin (1982) 67 Hal SZ - current 
19 Hal SZ - historical 
13 Non Hal SZ 
Imagery vividness 
assessed via presentation 
of cards Vividness of 
daydreams assessed 
No differences 
demonstrated between 
any of the groups 
 Heilbrun, Blum & Hass 
(1983) 
15 Hal SZ 
9 Non Hal SZ 
Participants reported 
vividness and sensory 
mode of 7 imagined 
events 
Hal SZ group less 
preference for auditory 
imagery relative to visual 
 Chandirami & Varma 20 Hal SZ Imagery vividness No difference between 
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(1987) 20 Non Hal SZ 
20 Controls 
assessed via the QMI. 
Imagery control assessed 
via the Gordon 
any of the groups 
regarding imagery 
vividness or control 
 Sack et al. (2005) 50 SZ 
50 controls 
Vividness of imagery and 
predisposition to 
hallucinations assessed via 
the QMI and the LSHS-R 
The SZ group scored 
significantly higher on the 
LSHS-R and in all 
sensory modalities of the 
QMI compared to the 
controls 
 Oertel et al. (2009) 52 SZ 
44 first-degree relatives 
92 controls 
All participants tested on 
the RHS and the QMI. 
Controls and relatives 
completed the German 
version of the SPQ 
Greatest imagery 
vividness demonstrated in 
the relatives. Lowest 
imagery vividness in low 
Szt group. No difference 
between patients and high 
Szt group 
Volitional imagery 
and hallucinations: 
introspective 
measures in non-
clinical populations 
 
 
   
 Barrett (1993) 62 psychology students 
divided into 2 groups: 
31 Hal students 
31 Non Hal students 
Groups created via scores 
on VHQ. Vividness of 
imagery assessed via the 
QMI 
Hal group reported 
significantly more vivid 
imagery than the Non-Hal 
group 
 Barrett & Caylor (1998) 24 high scorers on VHQ 
20 Hal SZ 
The two groups compared 
on the reality 
characteristics of their 
hallucinations 
No difference between 
groups on first 
hallucination. For most 
recent hallucination, 
students rated their image 
as more public and 
voluntary than SZ group 
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 Merckelbach & van der 
Ven (2001) 
14 Hal students (if they 
indicated hearing “White 
Christmas”) 
30 Non Hal students 
(original pool of 47) 
Hallucinatory experience 
measured via WC test, the 
QMI used to assess 
imagery vividness. 
Hallucinatory 
predisposition, fantasy 
proneness and social 
desirability assessed via 
the LSHS, CEQ and SDS 
No difference between 
groups on imagery 
vividness or social 
desirability. Hal group 
scored significantly 
higher on CEQ and 
LSHS. CEQ independent 
predictor of hallucinatory 
reports 
 Van der Ven & 
Merkelbach (2003) 
38 students Hal (if they 
indicated hearing “White 
Christmas”) 
70 students Non Hal 
(original pool of 111) 
Hallucinatory experience 
measured via the WC test 
The QMI used to assess 
imagery vividness 
Hallucinatory 
predisposition, fantasy 
proneness, social 
desirability and Szt 
assessed via the LSHS, 
CEQ, SDS and STA 
The Hal group scored 
higher on the QMI and 
the CEQ with the CEQ an 
independent predictor of 
hallucinatory reports 
 Bell & Halligan (2010) 46 high Szt 
43 low Szt 
Szt assessed via the O-
LIFE and vividness of 
imagery assessed via the 
VVIQ 
No difference in imagery 
vividness between Szt 
groups 
Volitional imagery 
and hallucinations: 
Objective measures in 
clinical and non-
clinical populations 
    
 Aleman, Bocker & de 
Haan (1999) 
26 Students high LSHS 
31 Students low LSHS 
(original pool of 74) 
Vividness of imagery 
assessed via the QMI and 
objective measures. 
Predisposition to 
No differences between 
high and low LSHS group 
on objective measures. 
High LSHS group 
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hallucinations assessed via 
the LSHS 
significantly greater self-
reported imagery 
vividness 
 Aleman et al. (2000) 19 Students high LSHS-
R 
17 Students low LSHS-R 
(original pool of 243) 
Vividness of imagery 
assessed via the QMI and 
VVIQ. Objective 
measures assessed 
imagery vividness and 
perception-imagery 
interaction. Predisposition 
to hallucinations assessed 
via the LSHS-R 
High LSRS-R group 
reported significantly 
more vivid images as 
rated on the VVIQ but not 
QMI. No difference on 5 
out 6 objective measures. 
The high LSHS group 
demonstrated greater 
imagery-perception 
differences 
 Bocker et al. (2000) 13 Hal SZ 
19 Non Hal SZ 
14 Controls 
Vividness of imagery and 
interaction between 
imagery and perception 
assessed using objective 
measures 
No group differences on 
vividness of imagery 
however Hal SZ benefited 
less from their visual 
imagery in determining a 
perception 
 Aleman et al. (2003) 22 Hal SZ 
35 Non Hal SZ 
 
Vividness of imagery and 
interaction between 
imagery and perception 
assessed using objective 
measures 
No group differences 
regarding vividness of 
imagery. Severity of 
hallucinations was 
significantly correlated 
with the role of imagery 
on perception 
Intrusive imagery and 
hallucinations 
    
 Jakes & Hemsley (1987) 24 “healthy” volunteers Assessed hypnagogic and 
hallucination experiences 
via interview. 
Predisposition to 
LSHS significantly 
associated with 
hypnagogic experiences 
but not hallucinations 
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hallucinations assessed 
using the LSHS 
 Morrison & Baker (2000) 15 Hal SZ 
15 Non Hal SZ 
15 Controls 
 
Participants were assessed 
on the DTQ and DVQ 
The HAL SZ group 
experienced more 
intrusions than the other 
groups 
 Morrison et al. (2002a) 35 SZ Participants asked about 
their experience of 
intrusive imagery 
Significant majority 
reported intrusive imagery 
accompanying psychotic 
symptoms 
 Holmes & Steel (2004) 42 participants Szt assessed via the O-
LIFE. Participants 
recorded intrusive 
experiences following 
presentation of traumatic 
film 
Szt correlated with reports 
of intrusive imagery. O-
LIFE independent 
predictor of intrusion 
frequency 
 Gracie et al. (2007) 228 students  Participants completed the 
TLEQ, SRS-PTSD, LSHS 
Positive relationship 
between intrusions and 
hallucinations 
 Marziller & Steel (2007) 50 participants on wait-
list for trauma service 
(original pool of 174) 
Participants completed the 
STA and PDS 
 
Positive relationship 
demonstrated between Szt 
and intrusions 
 Steel, Mahmood & 
Holmes, (2008) 
45 road-traffic survivors Participants completed the 
O-LIFE and PDS 
Positive relationship 
demonstrated between 
Unusual Experiences 
scale of O-LIFE and 
intrusions 
CEQ = Creative Experiences Questionnaire (Merkelback et al., 1998) 
DTQ = Distressing Thoughts Questionnaire (Clark & de Silva, 1985) 
DVQ = Distressing Voices Questionnaire (Clark & de Silva, 1985; Morrison & Baker, 2000) 
Gordon = The Gordon Test of Imagery Control (Gordon, 1949) 
Hal = Hallucinations 
LSHS = Launay Slade Hallucination Scale (Launay & Slade, 1981) 
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LSHS-R = Revised Launay Slade Hallucination Scale (Bentall & Slade, 1985) 
O-LIFE = Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences (Mason et al., 1995) 
PDS = Posttraumatic Stress Diagnostic Scale (Foa et al., 1997) 
QMI = Questionnaire upon Mental Imagery (Richardson, 1967) 
RHS = Revised Hallucination Scale (Morrison et al., 2002b) 
SDS = Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlow, 1964) 
SPQ = Schizotypy Personality Questionnaire (Raine, 1991) 
SRS-PTSD = the Self-Report Scale-Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (Gracie et al., 2007) 
STA = Schizotypal Personality Scale (Claridge & Broks, 1984) 
SZ – Schizophrenia 
Szt – Schizotypy 
TLEQ = Traumatic Life Events Questionnaire (Gracie et al., 2007) 
VHQ = Verbal Hallucinations Questionnaire (Barrett & Etheridge, 1992) 
VTE = Verbal Transformation Effect (Warren & Gregory, 1958) 
VVIQ = Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (Marks, 1973) 
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1. The relationship between volitional imagery and hallucinations  
1.1 Studies employing introspective measures in clinical populations 
The following is a review of 8 studies assessing the relationship between volitional 
imagery and hallucinations using introspective measures in clinical populations.  
 
Mintz and Alpert (1972) investigated whether vivid auditory imagery may be a 
necessary prerequisite for the experience of hallucinations. The study employed a 
quasi-experimental design with three groups of 20 participants: A “hallucinating 
schizophrenic” group; a “non-hallucinating schizophrenic” group; and a “non-
psychotic” control group. The schizophrenia diagnosis and presence or absence of 
hallucinations was determined by reviewing the medical notes and psychiatrist 
confirmation. The groups were matched for age and sex. Vividness of auditory 
imagery was assessed using the Spanos and Barber (1968) “White Christmas” task, 
in which participants were asked to close their eyes and imagine listening to the 
words and music of the song “White Christmas”, which was not actually played. 
Following this, vividness of the imaginary song, as well confidence levels were 
rated.  
 
The authors reported a significant difference between the groups; 17 of the 
“hallucinating schizophrenic” group reported that they heard the song being played 
(therefore described as having high auditory imagery) compared to 1 in the “non-
hallucinating” group and 8 in the control group. The authors concluded that two 
conditions are necessary for the experience of auditory hallucinations: Vivid imagery 
and impaired reality testing.  
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An important critique of this experimental paradigm is that it may be demonstrating 
participant suggestibility or adherence to perceived demand characteristics of the 
experiment. Furthermore, the reliability and validity of introspective self-report data 
cannot be determined.  
 
Slade (1976) investigated the psychological factors involved in the predisposition to 
auditory hallucinations. One aspect of this study centred on mental imagery as a 
predisposing factor. The study employed a quasi-experimental design with 2 small 
but well-matched groups of psychotic patients, differing only in whether auditory 
hallucinations were an aspect of their diagnosis. Both groups at the time of testing 
were not experiencing any psychotic symptoms. A control group was also formed 
consisting of participants with no history of mental illness. 
 
Mental imagery was tested via the shortened Betts Questionnaire upon Mental 
Imagery (QMI; Richardson, 1967), which is a 35-item scale measuring volitional 
mental imagery in all sensory modalities. Visual imagery control was assessed via 
the Gordon Test of Visual Imagery Control (Gordon, 1949). Participants were also 
assessed on the “Verbal Transformation Effect” (VTE: Warren & Gregory, 1958) 
whereby a word was repeatedly presented and participants pushed a button if they 
think they heard a different word. The hypotheses were that the auditory 
hallucinations psychotic group (AH) in comparison to the non-auditory hallucination 
psychotic group (non-AH) and the control group would score higher on imagery 
vividness, have less imagery control and generate more alternative words on the 
VTE. The results demonstrated no difference in vivid imagery between the AH and 
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non-AH group. However, the psychotic groups together scored higher on imagery 
vividness than the control group.  
 
The results were at variance with the findings of Mintz and Alpert (1972) who 
demonstrated a significant difference in imagery vividness between the AH and non-
AH groups. Slade (1976) identified that Mintz and Alpert (1972) measured only 
auditory imagery vividness, whereas the QMI taps into six sensory modalities. Yet 
the Slade (1976) study only tested 8 participants in each psychotic group, which may 
have represented insufficient power to pick up any differences.  
 
Following on from these studies, Brett and Starker (1977) investigated the hypothesis 
that an auditory hallucinations psychotic group (AH) would report greater imagery 
vividness and less imagery control than a non-AH psychotic group and a control 
group. Imagery vividness was tested via presentation of cards with items that the 
participants had to imagine. One of the items was the song “White Christmas” as 
used by Mintz and Alpert (1972). Other items included inanimate and emotional-
interpersonal content. Participants were asked to rate the vividness of the auditory 
image on a 5-point scale. Imagery controllability was measured using the Gordon 
Test of Visual Imagery Control (Gordon, 1949).  
 
Contrary to previous findings, no difference was found between any of the groups on 
imagery vividness or controllability. In fact, the only significant finding was that the 
AH psychotic group reported less vivid imagery than the control groups on 
emotional interpersonal items. The authors suggested a “discontinuous” model 
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whereby imagery processes are disrupted by emotion, reappearing in a more 
pathological form as a hallucination.  
 
In sum, the first three studies reported contradictory findings. An important critique 
of these studies is that there was no clarity on the criteria used for diagnosis. 
Similarly, it was not noted whether hallucinations were present or historical in either 
the hallucination or non-hallucination psychotic groups. As such, these issues call to 
question the reliability of the division of groups in these studies. In addition, the 
impact of anti-psychotic medication cannot be assessed and this may have had a 
significant impact on the findings. 
 
In addressing some of the concerns with diagnostic criteria, Starker and Jolin (1982) 
examined volitional auditory imagery in psychotic and non-psychotic populations 
using more standardised criteria for schizophrenia and hallucinations. They 
hypothesised that an auditory hallucination (AH) psychotic group would demonstrate 
a deficit in imagery vividness and fantasy compared to a non-AH psychotic group. 
This was a quasi-experimental study and categorisation was based on the Feighner 
criteria (Feighner et al., 1972). Participants were then divided into 3 groups: 
currently hallucinatory (N=67); previously hallucinatory (N=19); and non-
hallucinatory (N=13). The methodology was identical to Brett and Starker (1977), 
but the vividness, guilt and fear of failure in daydreams were also assessed via the 
Imaginal Process Inventory (Singer & Antrobus, 1972).  
 
The results demonstrated no significant differences between any of the groups on any 
of the items. This finding is thus contrary to Mintz and Alpert (1972) who 
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demonstrated support for vivid imagery as a pre-requisite for hallucinations. The 
findings are also contrary to Brett and Starker (1977) who demonstrated less vivid 
imagery in the hallucinatory group. 
 
A significant limitation of the study is the difference in the numbers of participants in 
each group. This was not commented upon by the authors, and it is possible that it 
affected the power of the study. Further, although a more standardised criterion was 
used to determine psychotic presentations, the criteria itself was based on an earlier 
classification system (DSM-III). In theory this system was less valid and reliable 
than the current one (DSM-IV). Furthermore, the authors did report significant 
differences in levels of anti-psychotic medication between the groups. This may have 
affected imagery vividness, especially in participants of the hallucinating group who 
were taking the highest levels of medication.  
 
Following the finding of reduced imagery vividness in psychotic compared to non-
psychotic populations (Brett & Starker, 1977), Heilbrun, Blum and Hass (1983) 
tested the hypothesis that hallucinations may reflect misrepresentations of images 
occurring in a non-preferred sensory mode. Accordingly, auditory hallucinations 
occur in people with less preference for auditory images. In addition, the authors 
investigated whether the non-preferred mode was accompanied by low levels of 
imagery vividness. Categorisation of groups was made on the basis of DSM-III 
criteria and hallucinating (N=15) and non-hallucinating (N=9) groups were formed. 
Participants were matched for age, sex and medication. The experimental paradigm 
was similar to that of Brett and Starker (1977) and Starker and Jolin (1982). In this 
instance, participants were asked to imagine 7 events (e.g. clapping hands) and report 
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the vividness and whether the image appeared to them in the visual or auditory 
mode. A second imagery measure was used whereby participants were instructed to 
evoke imagery ratings for both auditory and visual images.  
 
The results demonstrated that patients with auditory hallucinations showed less 
preference for auditory imagery relative to visual imagery. However, they did not 
demonstrate that this was connected to a reduction in the vividness of imagery. 
Similar to previous studies, categorisation was based on DSM-III criteria, which 
raises questions as to the reliability of the group differences. Moreover, the size of 
each groups were very small, thus increasing type-1 error probability. 
 
Based on the proposal that mental imagery and perceptual processes are closely 
linked and interdependent, Chandirami and Varma (1987) investigated vividness and 
control of volitional mental imagery in schizophrenic participants and normal 
controls. The study employed a quasi-experimental design with 20 participants in 3 
groups: A hallucinating schizophrenic group, a non-hallucinating schizophrenic 
group and a control group. Group selection was made on the basis of the Feighner 
criteria (Feighner et al., 1972) and the study was carried out in India. Participants’ 
mental imagery was assessed via the modified Betts Vividness of Imagery 
Questionnaire (QMI; Sheehan, 1967) and the Gordon’s Test of Visual Imagery 
Control (Gordon, 1949).  
 
The authors found no significant difference in vividness of mental imagery or control 
of imagery between any groups in any modality. However, there are potential 
limitations around the cultural specificity of the measures. 
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Similarly, Sack et al. (2005) investigated the vividness of mental imagery and 
hallucinations in a group of 50 patients with a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia, 
and 50 age and sex-matched controls in Germany. A translated version of the Betts 
QMI was used to assess the vividness of mental imagery in seven sensory modalities. 
Predisposition to hallucinations was assessed using a translated Launay and Slade 
scale (LSHS-R; Bentall & Slade, 1985). 
 
Results demonstrated that there was no correlation between the QMI and LSHS-R in 
either of the two groups. However, the schizophrenia group scored significantly 
higher on the LSHS-R and in all sensory modalities of the QMI as compared to the 
controls.  
 
Thus it was concluded that the paranoid schizophrenia group experienced greater 
vividness of mental imagery as compared to the control group. The lack of a 
correlation between the QMI and the LSHS-R may have been due to the fact that the 
QMI is a measure of volitional imagery vividness whereas the LSHS-R taps into 
more intrusive experiences. Therefore, it seems that these two quite different aspects 
of imagery may not be linked. A further critique is that the measures were interpreted 
to German. As such, it is unknown to what extent cultural and language differences 
may have impacted on the results.   
 
Oertel et al. (2009) investigated mental imagery vividness as a trait marker of 
psychosis, rather than hallucinations per se. Participants were 52 patients with a 
diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia, 44 first-degree relatives, and 92 healthy 
controls. All participants were tested on the Revised Hallucination Scale (RHS: 
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Morrison et al., 2002b), which is based on the LSHS-R (Bentall & Slade, 1985) and 
the QMI (Sheehan, 1967). Controls and relatives completed the German version of 
the Schizotypy Personality Questionnaire (SPQ: Raine, 1991). Psychometric tests 
were also carried out, though are not relevant to this review.  
 
The results demonstrated a significant difference in QMI scores between the groups. 
Post hoc analysis demonstrated greatest imagery vividness in the relatives, the lowest 
vivid imagery in the low schizotypy group, whilst patients and the high schizotypy 
group were in the middle. No difference was demonstrated between patients and high 
schizotype controls. Furthermore, patients scored significantly higher on the RHS 
than all other groups and no correlation was demonstrated between the QMI and the 
RHS. Imagery vividness was also independent of current psychopathology. 
 
Consequently, the authors concluded that mental imagery and predisposition to 
hallucinations are independent of each other. In accordance with Sack et al. (2005), 
they argued that imagery vividness is more related to the schizophrenia spectrum 
than to hallucinations per se.  
 
An important critique of this study was proposed by Bell and Halligan (2010), who 
argued that the comparison between high and low schizotypy controls relied on a 
relatively small sample (N=24 in each), which may have affected power. They 
completed a similar study, described in the next section.  
 
1.2 Studies employing introspective measures in non-clinical populations 
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The following is a review of 5 studies assessing the relationship between volitional 
imagery and hallucinations using introspective measures in non-clinical populations. 
 
Barrett (1993) investigated the relationship between self-rated verbal hallucinations 
and vividness of imagery. 62 psychology students (out of original pool of 131) who 
had completed the Verbal Hallucinations Questionnaire (VHQ: Barrett & Etheridge, 
1992) were divided into two groups: Hallucinators and non-hallucinators. The 
questionnaire consisted of items in which individuals could report hearing their name 
called when no one was there, or hearing the voices of absent friends or relatives. 
Participants were also tested on the Betts QMI Vividness of Imagery Scale 
(Richardson, 1967).  
 
The main finding was that the hallucinating group reported significantly more vivid 
imagery than the non-hallucinating group. As such, Barrett concluded that, 
“hallucinations are images misidentified by the reality discrimination process as 
perceptions” (p.66). This finding provides support for the notion that vivid imagery 
plays a role in the genesis of hallucinations. However, an alternative hypothesis 
might be that responses on the VHQ tap into hypnagogic or drug-induced 
experiences rather than true hallucinations.  
 
In addressing this issue, Barrett and Caylor (1998) investigated whether 
hallucinations in the general population are veridical accounts of hallucinations or 
whether they are daydreams or vivid images. In doing so, they assessed the reality 
characteristics of hallucinatory-type experiences and “true” hallucinations. 250 
college students completed the Verbal Hallucination Scale (VHS: Barrett & 
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Etheridge, 1992). On a questionnaire that assessed the reality characteristics of 
hallucinations, the 24 highest scores on the VHS were compared with the 
hallucinations of 20 participants with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. Items on the 
questionnaire tapped into characteristics of sensation, publicness, objectivity and 
independence. The authors found that 50% of students reported experiencing their 
hallucination as having all the characteristics of a perceptual event. Furthermore, 
they found no significant difference between the groups on any of the reality 
characteristics for the first verbal hallucination. For the most recent hallucination, 
students rated their image as significantly more public and voluntary than the 
schizophrenia group. 
 
As a result of these findings the authors concluded that instances of hallucinations in 
the general population contain the necessary characteristics to classify them as 
hallucinations. Furthermore, the finding that hallucinations in clinical populations do 
not always contain the full characteristics of a perception adds some weight behind 
the notion that hallucinations may be on a continuum with vivid mental imagery.  
 
Despite these results, Merckelbach and Van der Ven (2001) attempted to address 
whether reports of “hallucinations” may at times represent a particular response bias 
demonstrated by fantasy-prone individuals. They defined fantasy-proneness as a 
deep and profound involvement in fantasy and imagination (Lynn & Rhue, 1988). It 
has been demonstrated that fantasy-prone individuals have a tendency to endorse odd 
items (Merckelbach et al., 2000). The authors recruited 47 students who were 
assessed on the “White Christmas” test, the QMI (Sheehan, 1967), the Social 
Desirability Scale (SDS; Crowne & Marlow, 1964), the Launay-Slade Hallucination 
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Scale (LSHS; Launay & Slade, 1981), and the Creative Experiences Questionnaire 
(CEQ; Merkelback et al., 1998). The CEQ is an index of fantasy-proneness 
comprising 25 dichotomous items such as, “in general, I spend at least half of the day 
fantasizing or day-dreaming”, and “my fantasies are so vivid that they are like a good 
movie”. Following testing, two groups were created: A hallucination group, which 
consisted of 14 out of 44 participants who indicated that they heard the song on the 
“White Christmas” paradigm, and a non-hallucinating group of the remaining 
participants.  
 
The results demonstrated that the groups did not differ on measures of imagery 
vividness or social desirability. However, the hallucination group scored 
significantly higher on the CEQ and LSHS than the non-hallucination group. On a 
logistical regression analysis, the CEQ was the only predictor of hallucinatory 
reports. The authors concluded that the “White Christmas” paradigm may not be 
indicating a predisposition to hallucination, but rather a tendency to endorse odd 
items. However, they recognised an alternative interpretation that fantasy-proneness 
might drive impaired reality testing leading to hallucinatory reports. Limitations of 
the study include the use of quite a small sample of participants and they used the 
original LSHS scale, which has been found to be less reliable than revised scales 
(Bentall and Slade, 1985). 
 
Consequently, van de Ven and Merckelbach (2003) replicated and extended the 
study through increasing the sample size and using two scales measuring 
schizophrenia-like phenomena. In this study, 111 participants completed the “White 
Christmas” task and were assessed on the Schizotypal Personality Scale (STA; 
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Claridge & Broks, 1984), the LSHS (Launay & Slade, 1981), the QMI (Sheehan, 
1967), and the CEQ (Merkelback et al., 1998). 38 out of 108 participants who 
completed the study reported hearing the White Christmas song being played when it 
was not, thus suggesting they had a “hallucinatory-like” experience. The study 
demonstrated that individuals in the “hallucinatory” group scored significantly 
higher on the QMI and the CEQ, with the CEQ emerging as the greater predictor 
variable on a linear regression. The two groups did not differ on the LSHS or the 
STA. 
 
The authors concluded that the findings replicate those of Merckelbach and van de 
Ven (200l), in that fantasy-proneness may reflect an impaired reality testing that 
precipitates misattribution of internal events to external sources. However, as the 
authors suggested, it may be that fantasy-prone individuals have a tendency to 
endorse odd items. Therefore, the White Christmas task and other introspective 
measures may be tapping into a response bias rather than actual hallucinatory 
experiences.  
 
Bell and Halligan (2010) compared high (N=46) and low (N=43) schizotypes as 
measured on the O-LIFE (Mason et al., 2005) with scores on the Vividness of Visual 
Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ: Marks, 1973). Contrary to Oertel et al. (2009), the 
authors found no group differences in vividness of imagery between the schizotypy 
groups. In comparison to the study by Oertel et al. (2009), both used different 
measures of schizotypy. Further, Oertel et al. (2009) employed the QMI, which 
assesses vividness of imagery in 7 sensory modalities, whilst Bell and Halligan 
(2010) used the VVIQ, which only assesses visual imagery. 
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1.3 Studies employing objective measures in clinical and non-clinical populations 
As highlighted, the inconsistencies in the studies above may be due to limitations 
such as limited criteria used to define the groups, small sample sizes or unknown 
influence of neuroleptic medication. Furthermore, introspective measures such as the 
“White Christmas” task may lack construct validity in determining hallucinatory 
reports, and instead may reflect a response bias to endorse odd items (e.g. 
Merckelbach & van de Ven, 2001). Consequently, a number of researchers have 
attempted to study the relationship between imagery and hallucinations though 
employing what they term as “objective” measures. The following is a review of 4 
studies employing such objective measures in clinical and non-clinical populations.  
 
Aleman, Bocker and de Haan (1999) tested the hypothesis that greater imagery 
vividness would be related to reports of hallucinations due to greater difficulties in 
discriminating between an image and a percept. This is based on the work of Kosslyn 
(1994) that mental images like hallucinations have perceptual qualities and can occur 
in the absence of sensory stimuli. In determining whether a mental event is externally 
or internally generated (i.e. a perception or an image), an individual compares the 
amount of sensory, contextual and semantic attributes of the item (Johnson & Raye, 
1981).  
 
The authors employed a student population sample (N=74). The LSHS (Launay & 
Slade, 1981) determined hallucination predisposition and the Betts QMI 
(Richardson, 1967) measured vividness of imagery. In addition, participants were 
also tested on an objective measure of imagery vividness. This was done through the 
use of a task developed by Metha, Newcombe and de Haan (1992), which consists of 
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a perceptual and imagery condition. In the perceptual condition, a triad of line 
drawings were presented and participants selected the odd-one-out. In the imagery 
condition, only the names of the objects were read out, which meant that participants 
had to form mental images of the objects in order to make a discrimination. It was 
stated by the authors that the more vivid the images, the smaller the difference would 
be between the imagery and perceptual conditions. 
 
The results demonstrated no significant main effects of imagery vividness and 
hallucinations. There was a significant interaction effect between group and 
measures but post hoc tests were not significant. Consistent with Barrett (1993), the 
authors did demonstrate a significant effect of greater self-reported imagery 
vividness and predisposition to hallucinations. However, the current study employed 
the original Launay-Slade Hallucination scale (Launay & Slade, 1981), which may 
be less reliable than the revised scale (Bentall & Slade, 1985).  
 
Aleman et al. (2000) repeated the study by Aleman, Bocker and de Haan (1999) but 
added an additional introspective imagery questionnaire; the VVIQ (Marks, 1973), 
which is the visual subscale of the QMI but ratings are made with eyes open and 
closed. In addition, the authors included a number of additional objective tasks. An 
auditory task, similar to the visual task required participants to make a judgement of 
the odd item after presentation of either a triad of sounds or triad of descriptions. An 
imagery-perception interaction task was also included. On 25% of the trials, 
participants imagined the tone or letter to be recognised, another 25% of trials 
participants imagined a different tone or letter, and on the remaining 50% of trials no 
stimuli to be imagined were presented. The difference in the number of detected 
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stimuli in the “on-image” condition compared to the “off-image” condition was 
argued to be a measure of the interaction between imagery and perception. As such, a 
larger difference implies a greater effect of imagery, which was expected in 
participants with hallucinatory experiences according to the hypothesis that increased 
perceptual characteristics of mental images are associated with hallucinations.  
 
Out of 243 undergraduate students who completed the LSHS-R, the 19 highest 
scorers and 17 lowest scorers were selected, thus forming 2 groups. The high LSHS-
R group reported significantly more vivid images as rated on the VVIQ than the low 
group but not on the QMI. On the objective measures, the only difference found was 
on the visual object imagery task, whereby a larger difference between the imagery 
and perception performance was observed in the low LSHS-R group compared to the 
high group, thus indicating a decrease in perceptual characteristics of mental images. 
This finding was contrary to the authors’ hypotheses.  
 
Bocker et al. (2000) employed a clinical population and also investigated whether 
hallucinations arise as a result of misinterpreting internally generated images as 
externally based perceptions. They generated two hypotheses: Either the vividness of 
a perception might become degraded, or the vividness of mental imagery might 
increase.  
 
Participants were 32 psychiatric inpatients with a DSM-IV diagnosis of 
schizophrenia. Positive and negative symptoms were assessed using the Positive and 
Negative Symptom Scale (PANSS; Kay, Opler, & Fiszbein, 1987) regarding 
symptoms during the previous week. Lifetime experience of hallucinations was 
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assessed on the Comprehensive Assessment of Symptoms and History (CASH; 
Andreasen, 1987). Consequently, a hallucinating schizophrenic group was formed 
with 13 participants and a non-hallucinating group with 19 participants. This was 
based on the PANSS scores, and the two groups were also significantly different in 
the lifetime experiences of hallucinations. A control group was also formed (N=14) 
of participants with no history of mental health problems. They employed the task 
developed by Metha, Newcombe and de Haan (1992) as well as the interaction 
between imagery and perception task described above in the study by Aleman et al. 
(2000). 
 
No group differences were demonstrated on the perception task or on the first test of 
imagery vividness. On the interaction test, group differences were not significant. 
However, a significant interaction was demonstrated between modality and task. The 
authors explained that the hallucinating group profited less from the overlap between 
the image with presented stimulus than the non-hallucinating patients. They also 
argued that the findings provided some evidence that hallucinations might be formed 
in individuals whose auditory images have more percept-like qualities. However, it 
seems that these conclusions need to be balanced with the insignificant group 
differences on most of the tasks.   
 
Aleman et al. (2003) followed up the study by Bocker et al. (2000) but included a 
larger sample and more behavioural measures of imagery vividness. Accordingly, 
they investigated whether patients with and without hallucinations differ on tasks of 
imagery-perception relations. Further, they tested whether the severity of 
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hallucination would be related to an increased influence of imagery on perception 
(i.e. greater influencing of what they term as “top-down” processing). 
 
57 patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia were included in the study. DSM-IV 
diagnosis was made on the basis of the CASH and the PANSS. All except three were 
treated with atypical antipsychotics. 2 groups were formed: A hallucination group 
(N=22) and a non-hallucination group (N=35). Participants were tested on the same 
objective tasks as used by Aleman et al. (2000). In addition, the Topography of 
Voices Rating Scale (TVRS; Hustig & Hafner, 1990) was used to measure 
frequency, audibility, clarity and affective response to auditory hallucinations.  
 
No between group differences were found on any of the measures. However, on the 
interaction task, the severity of hallucinations was significantly correlated with the 
role of imagery on perception. That is, patients with more severe hallucinations 
demonstrated a significant gain of imagery on perception. Therefore, they concluded 
that top-down processes may “override” bottom-up information in determining a 
percept. Although this is an interesting result, it needs to be evaluated in the context 
of it being a post-hoc finding and of there being no significant group differences. 
 
2. The relationship between intrusive imagery and hallucinations 
All the aforementioned studies investigated a specific type of imagery, namely 
volitional imagery. The following 7 studies investigated intrusive imagery and its 
relationship with hallucinations. 
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Jakes and Hemsley (1987) interviewed 24 “healthy” volunteers on their hypnagogic 
experiences, hallucination experiences, and assessed imagery vividness on the 
Launay and Slade (1981) predisposition to hallucinations measure (LSHS). 
Hallucinations were defined by a response of “yes” to the question, “have you ever, 
while wide awake, had the experiences of, “seeing”, “hearing”, or “touching” a 
person or an animal who was not in fact really there” (p.765).  They found that the 
LSHS was significantly associated with hypnagogic experiences but not 
hallucinations.  
 
This study suggests that vivid imagery is related to hypnagogic rather than “true” 
hallucinatory experiences. However, a limitation of the study is that it used only 24 
participants who were placed into groups based on their scores on the interview. The 
small sample size raises significant concerns about whether the study was adequately 
powered. Furthermore, The Launay and Slade (1981) measure was subsequently 
revised replacing a yes/no response with a Likert scale, which increased reliability 
and validity (Bentall & Slade, 1985). 
 
Morrison and Baker (2000) investigated the role of intrusive mental events in the 
experience of auditory hallucinations. This is based on the theories of Hoffman 
(1986) and Hemsley (1993) that hallucinations arise from the intrusion of unexpected 
material from long-term memory. Morrison and Baker (2000) defined intrusions as 
automatic repetitive thoughts, images and impulses that are usually accompanied by 
affect (Rachman, 1981). They hypothesised that people with auditory hallucinations 
would experience more frequent intrusions and that these would be rated as more 
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distressing, uncontrollable and unacceptable in comparison to psychiatric patients 
without hallucinations and controls. 
 
A hallucination group consisted of 15 patients who had a DSM-IV diagnosis of 
schizophrenia and who were currently experiencing auditory hallucinations. The 
mean age of the participants was 43.93 years and the group consisted of 11 males 
and 4 females. A non-hallucination group met DSM-IV criteria for schizophrenia but 
had not heard voices for at least 3 years. The mean age was 42.93 years with 12 
males and 3 females. All participants in both psychiatric groups were being treated 
with neuroleptic medication. A non-psychiatric control group consisted of 15 
participants who had never experienced auditory hallucinations. The mean age of this 
group was 38.73 years and there were 10 males and 5 females.  
 
All participants completed the Distressing Thoughts Questionnaire (DTQ; Clark & 
de Silva, 1985) and the Distressing Voices Questionnaire (DVQ). The DTQ consists 
of 12 statements relating to intrusive thoughts or images and ratings of emotions and 
frequency on a 9-point likert scale. The DVQ was designed for this study and the 
authors substituted thought/image with the word, “voice”.  
 
The results demonstrated that the hallucination group experienced more anxiety-
related and depression-related intrusions than both the psychiatric and non-
psychiatric controls. Further, the hallucination group found these intrusions to be 
more worrying and more difficult to remove. 
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The limitations of this study are, firstly, only 13 participants in the hallucination 
group completed the questionnaires, which questions whether the study was 
adequately powered. Secondly, the authors developed the DVQ for this study. The 
reliability and validity of this measure had therefore not been assessed. Nevertheless, 
the study does support the notion that intrusive contents of consciousness may be 
related to auditory hallucinations. However, the study does not inform of the relative 
contribution of intrusive imagery. 
 
Consequently, Morrison et al. (2002a) investigated whether intrusive imagery is 
experienced in relation to psychotic symptoms. Participants were 35 patients with a 
diagnosis of a psychosis. Diagnosis was made on the basis of a clinical interview and 
case notes and checked against DSM-IV criteria. All patients were receiving 
cognitive therapy. 
 
During the cognitive therapy, participants were asked about their experience of 
imagery that accompanied their psychotic symptoms. Further, a semi-structured 
interview was used to evoke the image and explore its content and meaning. Of the 
35 participants, 74.3% identified an image in relation to their psychotic symptoms. 
Of these, 69.2% reported that their images were recurrent, 96.2% were able to link 
the image to an emotion, and 70.8% were able to associate the image with a 
particular event from the past. Consequently, it is hypothesised that similar to other 
psychological disorders, imagery may be involved in the maintenance of 
hallucinations and delusions. 
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Although previous studies have investigated imagery in relation to psychosis, this 
study was the first to assess whether individuals with psychosis have related intrusive 
imagery. Despite the positive findings, there are a number of limitations. Firstly, this 
was not an experimental study so the findings can only be used to form hypotheses to 
then test experimentally. Secondly, the participants were currently engaged in 
cognitive therapy. As such, they could represent a homogeneous population (i.e. 
those suitable for therapy) and their responses may reflect a bias to report what they 
felt the experimenter was looking for.  
 
Based on preliminary findings of intrusive imagery being involved in psychotic 
experiences, Holmes and Steel (2004) employed an analogue design to investigate 
whether individuals who scored high in schizotypy (as compared to low scoring 
schizotypes) would demonstrate more intrusions following presentation of a 
traumatic film. 42 participants completed the Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of 
Feelings and Experiences (O-LIFE; Mason et al., 1995) and, following presentation 
of a traumatic film of a road traffic accident, used a diary to record spontaneously 
occurring intrusions related to the film over the subsequent 7 days. Within a 
regression analysis, schizotypy was correlated with intrusion frequency and the 
Unusual Experiences scale of the O-LIFE was an independent predictor of intrusion 
frequency.  
 
However, as this was an analogue study, the external validity of the findings remains 
questionable. Furthermore, the study relied on self-report of intrusions, which raises 
a potential fundamental issue. It is, for example, possible that individuals who are 
high in schizotypy (in particular the Unusual Experiences scale) may be more likely 
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to endorse odd items with regard to the situational demands of an experimental 
situation. This has been demonstrated in individuals high in fantasy-proneness, 
which is highly correlated with schizotypy (Meckelback et al., 1998). Furthermore, 
once such individuals are asked to report intrusive imagery, they may be more likely 
to attend to these unusual experiences. Therefore, the high schizotypal individuals 
may not be experiencing more intrusions but are perhaps more likely to notice, attend 
and report the intrusions they do have.  
 
Similarly, Gracie et al. (2007) investigated whether re-experiencing symptoms (i.e. 
intrusive imagery) would be associated with the experience of hallucinations. 228 
students completed the Traumatic Life Events Questionnaire (TLEQ), the Self-
Report Scale-Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (SRS-PTSD), the LSHS (Bentall & 
Slade, 1985) and the Structured Interview for Assessing Perceptual Anomalies 
(SIAPA). Other measures were used but are not relevant to this review. The authors 
demonstrated that 88.6% of participants had experienced at least 1 trauma and 14.5% 
met the criteria for PTSD. Using a logistical regression with the LSHS as the 
dependant variable they demonstrated that the re-experiencing symptoms of PTSD 
(i.e. intrusive imagery) predicted hallucinations. However, the variability explained 
by the re-experiencing symptoms alone was relatively small (3%). 
 
Consequently, the study suggests a correlation between intrusive imagery and 
hallucination predisposition but also highlights that other mechanisms may be 
involved. However, the study has a number of limitations. It employed a 
retrospective, cross-sectional, analogue design. Therefore, meditational factors are 
unknown and the external validity of the findings remains unknown.  
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Marziller and Steel (2007) investigated further the relationship between intrusions 
and schizotypy. Participants were patients at a trauma service who were seeking help 
for posttraumatic stress more than 1 month after the traumatic event. 50 out of 174 
participants returned a series of questionnaires, which included the Schizotypal 
Personality Scale (STA; Claridge & Broks, 1984) and the Posttraumatic Stress 
Diagnostic Scale (PDS; Foa et al., 1997), which assesses the frequency of intrusions 
as well as the effect of PTSD symptoms.  
 
The authors found a positive relationship between schizotypy and posttraumatic 
symptomatology and in particular the re-experiencing subscale of the PDS. The 
authors concluded that the study supports the notion of schizotypy as a vulnerability 
factor for traumatic intrusions. However, it is important to consider that this was a 
retrospective, cross-sectional design, and the response rate was fairly low.   
 
In a similar study, Steel, Mahmood and Holmes (2008) investigated whether 
schizotypy was related to PTSD symptomatology. In this study, 45 individuals were 
interviewed between 7 and 31 days after a road traffic accident. Participants 
completed the O-LIFE, a measure of schizotypy (Mason et al., 1995), but only the 
Unusual Experiences subscale was included for analysis. The PDS (Foa et al., 1997) 
was also completed. Additional measures were administered but these are not 
relevant to this review. 
 
Employing a multiple regression, the Unusual Experiences scale of the O-LIFE was 
significantly associated with the PDS. This is suggestive of a link between 
hallucinatory experiences and intrusive imagery. However, the results are limited by 
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the retrospective nature of the data and cross-sectional analysis. Furthermore, in this 
study, as well as in Marziller and Steel (2007), some participants may have been 
more inclined to endorse odd items and to complete and return the questionnaires. It 
is also possible that the experience of trauma itself influences the response on 
schizotypy scales. Accordingly, individuals experiencing flashbacks may be likely to 
score highly on questions pertaining to unusual experiences. As such, it may be that 
traumatic experiences are associated with schizotypy, or perhaps that the measures 
are not sensitive to the difference between flashbacks following a trauma and 
unusual experiences more related to hallucinations. 
 
Discussion 
 
Summary of the literature 
The early studies exploring a relationship between imagery and hallucinations 
employed introspective measures in clinical populations. The results of these studies 
were fairly inconsistent. Some studies found greater vividness of imagery in 
hallucinating individuals compared to non-hallucinating clinical groups and controls 
(e.g. Mintz & Alpert, 1972). Other studies found that only clinical groups with a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia, regardless of the presence of hallucinations, 
demonstrated greater imagery vividness as compared to controls (e.g. Oertel et al., 
2009; Sack et al., 2005; Slade, 1976). Some studies found no difference in imagery 
vividness between any groups (e.g. Chandrimani & Varma, 1987) or indeed less 
imagery vividness in a hallucinating group (Brett & Starker, 1977). Heilbrun, Blum 
and Hass (1983) demonstrated that people with auditory hallucinations show less 
preference for auditory imagery. However, rather than this process demonstrating a 
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theoretical account of hallucinations, it is quite possible that this represents an 
avoidance mechanism. As such, consciously producing visual representations may be 
less anxiety provoking.  
 
A number of limitations to these studies were presented. In the earlier studies, 
insufficient categorisation may have affected the reliability of the groups, the small 
sample sizes, raised questions of whether studies were adequately powered. 
Furthermore, all of the studies using clinical populations did not assess the impact of 
neuroleptic medication. 
 
Some of the more recent studies assessing imagery vividness and hallucinations have 
used general population samples based on the continuum hypothesis of psychotic-
like experiences (Claridge, 1987). In some studies, enhanced imagery vividness was 
demonstrated in individuals with hallucinatory experiences (e.g. Barrett, 1993). On 
the other hand, Bell and Halligan (2010) demonstrated no difference in visual 
imagery vividness in high and low schizotypy groups.  
 
The main critique of these studies centres on whether reports of hallucinatory 
experiences in the general population are veridical accounts of hallucinations. Barrett 
and Caylor (1998) demonstrated that hallucinations in the general population do 
contain the necessary reality characteristics to class them as “true” hallucinations. 
However, Merckelbach and van de Ven (2001) and van de Ven and Merckelbach, 
(2003) argued that some accounts of hallucinations might reflect a tendency to 
endorse odd items within an experimental paradigm. 
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To address some of the limitations of using introspective measures to assess imagery 
vividness, a number of researchers employed what they termed as “objective” 
measures. Results from these studies were mixed. Aleman, Bocker and de Haan 
(1999) and Aleman et al. (2000) on the whole did not find a relationship between 
imagery and hallucinations using the objective measures but did with the 
introspective measures. However, Aleman et al. (2000) contrary to their hypothesis, 
found that the hallucinating group reported using imagery less in determining a 
perception. Employing clinical populations, Bocker et al. (2000) and Aleman et al. 
(2003) did not find any significant differences between hallucinating and non-
hallucinating groups on objective tests of imagery vividness. However, contrary to 
Aleman et al. (2000), both studies demonstrated a trend for patients with 
hallucinations to use imagery more in determining a perception.  Based on the 
findings, it was argued that in individuals prone to hallucinations, imagery may play 
a greater role in determining a perception, which may create difficulties in reality 
discrimination (Aleman et al., 2003). However, these findings lack robustness and 
further empirical support seems to be required to confirm this hypothesis. 
 
Importantly, all the aforementioned studies employed measures assessing volitional 
mental imagery. Such measures included the “White Christmas” task and the QMI, 
which assess respectively, volitional auditory imagery vividness and multi-sensory 
volitional imagery vividness. Volitional imagery has been the dominant 
interpretation of imagery within this field of investigation, yet is only one construct 
within the domain of imagery. 
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In light of this, a final area of investigation has involved the investigation of intrusive 
imagery. Within clinical populations, it was demonstrated that individuals with a 
diagnosis of a psychotic disorder, have more intrusive experiences than controls 
(Morrison & Baker, 2000) and in particular, more intrusive imagery (Morrison et al., 
2002a). Furthermore, Holmes and Steel (2004) demonstrated that individuals high in 
schizotypy experienced more intrusive imagery following presentation of a traumatic 
film compared to individuals low in schizotypy. However, Jakes and Hemsley (1987) 
demonstrated that vivid imagery in the general population may be more related to 
hypnagogic experiences than hallucinations. Within populations with a trauma 
history, schizotypy was found to be correlated with re-experiencing phenomena such 
as intrusive imagery (Gracie et al., 2007; Marziller & Steel, 2007).  
 
These findings together are suggestive of a relationship between intrusive imagery 
and psychotic phenomena. However, the Unusual Experiences scale of schizotypy, 
and predisposition to hallucination measures may lack sensitivity to differentiate 
between intrusive imagery and “true” hallucinatory experiences. Furthermore, the 
methodologies of the studies were limited in terms of their scope to assess causality, 
relationship direction or meditational factors. The methodologies included, 
descriptive designs (Morrison et al., 2002a), analogue designs (Holmes & Steel, 
2004) and retrospective, cross-sectional designs (Gracie et al., 2007; Marziller & 
Steel, 2007; Steel, Mahmood & Holmes, 2008).  
 
Furthermore, an alternative explanation of the Holmes and Steel (2004) finding, is 
that individuals who were high in schizotypy (in particular on the Unusual 
Experiences scale) may have been more likely to endorse odd items and thus notice, 
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attend to and report more intrusive phenomena. This has been demonstrated in 
individuals high in fantasy-proneness, which is highly correlated with schizotypy 
(e.g. Merckelbach & van der Ven, 2001).  
 
Synthesis of the findings 
The first question of the review pertains to whether a relationship exists between 
hallucinations and mental imagery. The research has demonstrated difficulties in 
distinguishing between imagery and hallucinations, which creates difficulties in 
reaching conclusions as to a potential relationship. Nevertheless, the majority of the 
studies employed measures tapping into volitional imagery and it seems likely that 
this construct is unrelated to hallucination formation. Indeed, Bentall (1990), in a 
review of the literature on hallucinations, reached similar conclusions. The few 
positive findings in the area (e.g. Barrett, 1993; Mintz & Alpert, 1972), may be 
reflective of a specific response-bias to endorse odd-items. Alternatively, in the 
general population studies, vivid imagery may be related to hypnagogic experiences 
rather than hallucinations per se (Jakes & Hemsley, 1987). There have been some 
suggestions of volitional imagery ability being involved in determining a perception. 
However, such a relationship lacks robust empirical validation. Consequently, it 
seems that the research does not strongly support an association between volitional 
imagery and hallucinations. However, there has been some consistency in the 
findings between vivid volitional imagery and the psychotic construct (Oertel et al., 
2009; Sack et al., 2005; Slade, 1976). It has thus been argued therefore that vivid 
volitional imagery may represent a trait marker across the schizophrenia spectrum 
(Oertel et al. 2009).  
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There have also been some consistent findings in the area of intrusive imagery and 
psychotic phenomena. Accordingly, intrusive imagery has been demonstrated to be 
associated with hallucinations or psychotic-like experiences (Morrison et al., 2002a). 
However, the nature of this association is unclear and these studies have employed 
either non-experimental or analogue designs. Moreover, determining whether reports 
of intrusive imagery in these studies are veridical or also representative of a 
response-bias is unknown.  
 
The modality of imagery and hallucinations is an area rarely addressed by the 
researchers. Horowitz (1975) proposed that individuals prone to hallucinations might 
demonstrate an imagery deficit, causing them to misattribute vivid images to an 
external source. The vast majority of the research has been conducted using 
participants with auditory hallucinations and has concluded that this is unrelated to 
volitional imagery in any domain (as assessed via the QMI). In the area of intrusive 
imagery, the findings are less clear. Morrison and Baker (2000) assessed only 
auditory hallucinations and the modality of intrusive imagery was not assessed. 
Similarly, Morrison et al. (2002a) assessed visual imagery but did not comment on 
the modality of hallucinations. Within the other studies, the modality of intrusive 
imagery and hallucinations was not the focus of investigation (e.g. Marziller & Steel, 
2007).   
 
The second question of the review pertains to whether any theoretical account of a 
relationship between hallucinations and mental imagery can be supported by the 
literature. The first theory presented centred on a potential association between the 
vividness of imagery and hallucinations. It appears that vividness of volitional 
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imagery is unrelated to hallucinations. In the area of intrusive imagery, no studies 
were identified that have investigated such a relationship. 
 
Further, the research presented would also not support the theory that hallucinations 
arise as a result of mis-representing volitional imagery as externally-based 
perceptions (e.g. Aleman, Bocker & de Haan, 1999). This is based on the work of 
Kosslyn (1994) that mental images like hallucinations have perceptual qualities and 
can occur in the absence of sensory stimuli. In determining whether a mental event is 
externally or internally generated (i.e. a perception or an image) an individual 
compares the amount of sensory, contextual and semantic attributes of the item 
(Johnson & Raye, 1981).  
 
However, in many ways this theory might be compatible with theoretical accounts of 
an association between intrusive imagery and hallucinations. Steel, Fowler and 
Holmes (2005) argued that hallucinations may arise as a result of weak encoding of 
contextual information. As such, intrusive memories from traumatic events appear 
into consciousness involuntarily, contain the sensory and emotion characteristics of 
the event, but lack the temporal, verbal and contextual information to help make 
sense of the experience. Therefore, it may be that a hallucination is an intrusive 
image misrepresented as an external perception as a result of poor contextual 
information contained within the sensory image. However, despite positive findings 
of an association between intrusive imagery and hallucinations, direct testing and 
support for such a theoretical account does not seem to have been demonstrated.  
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Clinical implications and future research 
A number of theoretical accounts propose an association between the vividness of 
mental imagery and hallucinations. Although this review does not support this 
relationship in the area of volitional imagery, no studies investigated the vividness of 
intrusive imagery and hallucinations. Further, the modality of imagery and 
hallucinations has been a neglected area and so future research could focus on the 
relationship between the sensory modality of intrusive imagery and hallucinations.  
 
Predominantly, future research may benefit from investigating further the 
psychological mechanisms underlying intrusive experiences and psychotic 
phenomena. In particular, to test the predictions of Steel, Fowler and Holmes (2005) 
that hallucinations may arise as a result of weak encoding of contextual information. 
This would result in a vulnerability to experience a stream of intrusive material 
entering consciousness involuntarily. Similarly, the theoretical proposition proposed 
by Aleman and colleagues (e.g. Aleman, Bocker & de Haan, 1999) that 
hallucinations may be misrepresentations of mental imagery as external perceptions 
might bear more fruitful findings if intrusive imagery were tested in addition to 
volitional imagery.  
 
As intrusive imagery are the sine qua non of PTSD, this area of research poses 
important questions regarding an association between PTSD and psychosis and 
indeed trauma and psychosis. Research has already demonstrated a high prevalence 
of trauma in psychotic populations (Read et al., 2005). Furthermore, similar to the 
“flashback” in PTSD, Read and Argyle (1999) found an “obvious” link in the content 
of hallucinations and childhood abuse in over half of their inpatient sample.  
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From a theoretical standpoint, traumatic events may result in cumulatively weaker 
contextual processing abilities (Steel, Fowler & Holmes, 2005) resulting in both a 
vulnerability to experience vivid, emotional and traumatic flashbacks, as well as 
intrusive imagery from day-to-day stressful events. Such intrusive mental events 
would be highly affect-laden and difficult to link to autobiographical memories of 
events. In order to make sense of these experiences of consciousness, Morrison 
(2001) proposed that some people might make culturally unacceptable interpretations 
thus creating the template of a hallucinatory experience. Evidently, further research 
is required in order to guide understanding and treatments. 
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Abstract 
Aims 
This study tested the hypothesis that hallucinations exist on a continuum with 
intrusive imagery and that contextual processing underlies this relationship. The 
study hypothesised that weak contextual (allocentric) processing would correlate 
with intrusive images that are vivid, sensory and possess a strong sense of nowness. 
Further, that hallucination-proneness would also be associated with a weaker 
contextual system either directly or indirectly via the presence of intrusive imagery. 
Method 
A cross-sectional, correlation design was employed using a general population 
sample. 55 participants completed a virtual environment task that probed allocentric 
and egocentric processing and memory. An intrusive interview paradigm and 
measures assessing predisposition to psychotic experiences were also employed.    
Results 
Weaker allocentric processing was associated with intrusive images with a greater 
sense of “nowness”. Both egocentric and allocentric systems were related to the 
sensory attributes of intrusive imagery. Predisposition to hallucinations was 
associated with greater “nowness” of intrusive imagery and post-hoc findings 
demonstrated a relationship between weaker allocentric processing and more extreme 
cases on the hallucination scale. 
Conclusion 
The findings supported some of the hypotheses, which have clinical implications 
with regard to understanding psychotic features within traumatised individuals and 
the development of psychosis more widely. Limitations and further areas of research 
are discussed. 
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Introduction 
Although hallucinations have been demonstrated in physical disorders (Assad & 
Shapiro, 1986), a range of psychological disorders (e.g. Brewin & Patel, 2010) and in 
the general population (e.g. Barrett & Etheridge, 1992), they have been 
predominantly reified into a primary symptom of schizophrenia. More specifically, 
the symptoms of schizophrenia as defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders IV include, hallucinations, delusions and disorganised speech 
(DSM-IV: APA, 1994). Many researchers have attempted to explain the nature of 
hallucinatory experiences (e.g. Bentall, 1990), and one such theory centres on the 
relationship between mental imagery and hallucinations. The majority of the research 
in this area has employed paradigms probing volitional mental imagery (e.g. 
Chandirami & Varma, 1987; Mintz & Alpert, 1972) and the findings have been 
inconsistent and unclear. However, more consistent findings have been demonstrated 
when investigating a relationship between intrusive imagery and hallucinations. 
 
Theories of a relationship between intrusive imagery and psychotic experiences 
A number of theoretical accounts have been proposed to explain an association 
between intrusive imagery and psychotic experiences. Some authors have argued that 
people with psychosis and psychosis-prone individuals experience a greater amount 
of intrusive imagery. For example, within clinical populations, it has been 
demonstrated that individuals with a diagnosis of a psychosis have more intrusive 
experiences than controls (Morrison & Baker, 2000) and in particular, more intrusive 
imagery (Morrison et al., 2002). Holmes and Steel (2004) demonstrated that 
individuals high in schizotypy experienced more intrusive imagery following 
presentation of a traumatic film compared to individuals low in schizotypy. Within 
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populations with a trauma history, hallucinatory type experiences as measured on a 
schizotypy measure were found to be correlated with greater intrusive re-
experiencing phenomena (Gracie et al., 2007; Marziller & Steel, 2007). As a result, 
both intrusive imagery and hallucinations have been seen as an extension of the same 
phenomenon. Indeed, Morrison (2001) argued that psychotic experiences and in 
particular hallucinations, may represent culturally unacceptable interpretations of 
intrusive mental events. However, the designs of these studies have been limited in 
terms of their scope to assess causality, relationship direction or mediational factors. 
 
Other theorists have highlighted the phenomenological similarities between intrusive 
imagery and hallucinations. Intrusive images are often experienced as repetitive, 
uncontrollable and distressing (Holmes & Matthews, 2005). In posttraumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD), intrusive re-experiencing images have been found to be directly 
related to traumatic events (Brewin & Holmes, 2003), carry sensory and emotional 
information related to the perceived “worst” moment of the trauma (Grey, Holmes & 
Brewin, 2001), be experienced as occurring in the present (sense of “nowness”: 
Brewin, Dagleish & Joseph, 1996) and contain a sense of “current threat” (Ehlers & 
Clark, 2000). Similarly, the content of hallucinations are often directly related to 
traumatic events (Read & Argyle, 1999), experienced as happening in the present, 
and appear into consciousness involuntarily (Nayani & David, 1996). Further, these 
intrusive phenomena are also highly affect laden (Morrison, 2001), and both 
psychotic hallucinations and PTSD intrusions can contain highly sensory information 
(Van de Kolk et al., 1996). 
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A final theory outlines an information processing account to explain a relationship 
between intrusive imagery and hallucinations. It has been argued that a weakening of 
the influence of spatial and temporal regularities on perception, may result in a 
vulnerability to experience intrusions from material stored in long-term memory  
(Hemsley, 2005; Steel, Hemsley & Pickering, 2002). Following on from this, Steel, 
Fowler and Holmes (2005) proposed that this ability to integrate information into its 
spatial and temporal context may exist on a continuum (continuum of contextual 
integration hypothesis). They argued that individuals with psychosis and psychosis-
prone individuals may exhibit a weak “baseline” ability to encode spatial and 
temporal information. This would result in a vulnerability to experience a stream of 
intrusive imagery intruding into conscious awareness.  
  
An updated theoretical account of a relationship between intrusive imagery and 
hallucinations 
It is possible to further understand the relationship between hallucinations and 
intrusive imagery by drawing on recent theories of psychological mechanisms 
believed to underpin the development of intrusive imagery. One such theory is the 
revised dual representation theory presented by Brewin and colleagues (2010). 
 
Two Systems 
It has been proposed that there exists two systems for encoding, storing and 
retrieving memories of events (e.g. Bisby et al., 2010). The revised dual 
representation theory (Brewin et al., 2010) describes the processes by which 
intrusive phenomena (in particular images) arise via the specific function and 
interaction of these two systems. 
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One system is responsible for encoding as much sensory information as possible 
relating to an experienced event. Contained within this system are representations 
bound to the sensations and perceptions, in a form similar to how they were 
experienced (S-reps). This system is comparable to the one thought to support 
“flashbulb memories” (Brown & Kulik, 1977). As such, S-reps are encoded as 
egocentric, viewpoint-dependent, inflexible representations. Recall of S-reps occurs 
indirectly via the activation of matching environmental (associated) or internal 
(situational) cues. S-reps are understood to be connected to body state and emotion 
areas, such as the insula and amygdala (Burgess et al., 2001; Byrne, Becker & 
Burgess, 2007). 
 
The other system encodes selected features of an event, including visual features, 
using a set of abstract codes. This system creates representations that are responsible 
for placing the experience into its appropriate context, including time and space (C-
reps). C-reps are encoded and stored as verbally accessible, allocentric, viewpoint-
independent, flexible representations, and are understood to be supported by the 
medial temporal lobe and hippocampus (Burgess et al., 2001; Byrne, Becker & 
Burgess, 2007). 
 
Healthy encoding and recall 
During normal encoding and recall, C-reps and S-reps are believed to be closely 
linked via representations in the medial parietal cortex (Burgess et al., 2001; Byrne, 
Becker & Burgess, 2007). Activation of the lower-level sensory cortices during 
perception of an event activates the higher-level medial temporal structures. 
Similarly, deliberate retrieval of C-reps from long-term memory triggers the 
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associated S-reps. Therefore, an S-rep can be activated “bottom-up” via an associated 
cue, or “top-down” via its connections with higher level representations. During 
healthy, voluntary recall, S-reps are activated “top-down” and are integrated into 
their appropriate autobiographical context, which inhibits “bottom-up” re-
experiencing. 
 
Intrusive imagery within the revised dual representation model 
It is well documented that during moments of extreme stress the amygdala is 
facilitated and hippocampus inhibited (e.g. Metcalfe & Jacobs, 1998). Based on the 
revised dual representation model this would create strong S-reps and weak C-reps, 
with impaired connections between them. S-reps would be more likely to be 
activated “bottom up” via corresponding cues because of the lack of “top down” 
control. This would result in sensory, vivid, egocentric intrusions that are void of 
contextual information (including a time-code and spatial information) and 
vulnerable to automatic retrieval. 
 
Bisby et al. (2010) tested predictions of the revised dual representation theory that 
weak allocentric encoding and intact egocentric encoding would result in more 
frequent intrusive images. Participants were divided into a placebo group, a low-dose 
alcohol group and a high-dose alcohol group. The authors employed a memory task 
that probes both allocentric and egocentric representations of space (King et al., 
2002). Participants also recorded intrusions following a trauma film paradigm. The 
authors hypothesised that low doses of alcohol would affect the allocentric system, 
whereas high doses of alcohol would affect both allocentric and egocentric systems. 
The results demonstrated that the low-dose alcohol group had reduced allocentric 
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performance and reported more intrusions than the high-dose or placebo groups. This 
supported the theory of two systems for encoding, retrieving and storing memories of 
events and that a greater frequency of intrusive imagery is related to weak allocentric 
encoding with intact egocentric encoding. 
 
Intrusive imagery and hallucinations 
It has been argued that a weakening of the influence of spatial and temporal 
regularities on perception may result in a vulnerability to experience intrusions from 
material stored in long-term memory (Hemsley, 2005; Steel, Hemsley & Pickering, 
2002). Consequently, Steel, Fowler and Holmes (2005) proposed that this ability to 
integrate information into its spatial and temporal context may exist on a continuum 
with those at the weaker end vulnerable to experiencing more intrusive, 
hallucinatory-type experiences. 
 
Within the revised dual representation model this would mean that a relatively 
weaker “baseline” ability to form allocentric C-rep with intact S-reps would result in 
a vulnerability to experience a flood of highly sensory, vivid intrusions, void of 
contextual information. These intrusions would also be void of a verbal narrative and 
difficult to link to a memory of an event. Accordingly, a hallucination is argued to be 
on the extreme end of an intrusive imagery continuum, and thus is an individual’s 
best attempt to make sense of this experience of consciousness (Morrison, 2001).  
 
Gaps in the literature 
Despite these theories there is little in the way of empirical support. It is important to 
test predictions of the revised dual representation theory (Brewin et al., 2010) in 
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terms of the mechanisms by which intrusive images may develop. As such, no 
research has been identified that has assessed the relationship between the properties 
of intrusive imagery and egocentric versus allocentric processing. To date, no 
research has also tested to what extent egocentric and allocentric processing is 
related to hallucinatory experiences. 
 
Current Study 
The revised dual representation theory (Brewin et al., 2010) provides theoretical 
support for speculating that a specific information processing style may incur 
vulnerability to intrusive imagery. Further, it has been argued that this information 
processing style may exist on a continuum, with those at the weaker end exhibiting 
more intrusive, hallucinatory type experiences (Steel, Fowler & Holmes, 2005).  
 
This study aims to test the revised dual representation theory (Brewin et al., 2010) 
and updated version of the contextual integration hypothesis. More specifically, it is 
the first study to investigate the relationship between the properties of intrusive 
imagery and egocentric versus allocentric processing. Further, this is the first study 
to investigate a relationship between hallucinations and egocentric versus allocentric 
processing. It is hoped that results from this study will contribute to an understanding 
of the relationship between intrusive imagery and hallucinations and psychological 
mechanisms that may underlie this relationship. 
 
Hypotheses 
1. It is predicted that participants who report intrusive images versus 
participants who do not report intrusive images, will have weaker allocentric 
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processing with intact egocentric processing abilities. Further, for participants 
who do report intrusive imagery, greater frequency of images will be related 
to weaker allocentric and intact egocentric processing. 
2. Greater predisposition to hallucinations is predicted to be related to greater 
frequency of intrusive imagery. 
3. Weaker allocentric and intact egocentric abilities is hypothesised to correlate 
with intrusive images that have a greater sense of “nowness” (the extent to 
which the intrusive image is experienced as a real event occurring in the 
present), and greater sensory properties, and are more uncontrollable, vivid 
and emotional.  
4. It is also hypothesised that weaker allocentric and intact egocentric 
processing will correlate with hallucination-proneness, either directly or 
indirectly via the sense of “nowness”, vividness and/or sensory detail of 
intrusive imagery. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
55 participants were recruited from the research subject pool of the Department of 
Clinical, Health and Education Psychology at University College London (UCL). 
Participants were aged between 18-52 years and were paid £10 for participation.  
 
Ethics 
The study was granted UCL ethics approval (see appendix 1) and conducted in 
accordance with these policies and procedures. Participants were provided with 
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information about the study in an information sheet prior to participation (see 
appendix 2). In addition, participants signed a consent form (see appendix 3), which 
detailed confidentiality and privacy procedures, and stated that participants could 
withdraw from the study at any point. All data was anonymised to ensure 
confidentiality, and electronic data was kept on a secure UCL account at all times. 
 
Study Design 
A one-group, cross-sectional, analogue design was employed. 
 
Power analysis 
Based on a Multiple Regression, medium effect size (0.15), Alpha at 0.05, Power at 
0.8 and 2 predictors, Sample Size (N) = 55. This was calculated using G*Power 
(Faul et al. 2007). A medium rather than small effect size was selected in order to 
manage the practicalities of carrying out this research. 
 
Procedure 
Participants were invited to take part in a study investigating, “mental imagery and 
unusual experiences”. Participants were provided with a participant information 
sheet and allocated an allotted time slot if they still wished to take part. Participants 
were told to set aside 1 hour and 15 minutes to complete the testing. All participants 
completed the following in the following order: An information-processing task 
assessing allocentic and egocentric encoding (King et al., 2002); the State-Trait 
Anxiety Inventory (STAI: Spielberger, 1983); questionnaires assessing 
predisposition to psychotic phenomena, including, the Revised Launay-Slade 
Hallucination Scale (LSHS-R: Bentall & Slade, 1985; Launay & Slade, 1981), the 
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shortened version of the Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences 
(O-LIFE(s): Mason, Linney & Claridge, 2005). Participants finally completed an 
intrusive imagery interview (based on Patel et al., 2007) 
 
Virtual environment (VE) task - King et al. (2002) 
King et al. (2002) designed a task that investigates egocentric and allocentric 
encoding and retrieval. The task was originally used to test a patient with focal 
bilateral hippocampal damage and demonstrated selective allocentric impairment. 
The task has subsequently been demonstrated as a valid and reliable tool for 
assessing contextual processing (e.g. Bisby et al., 2010). 
 
On a computer screen participants were presented with a virtual environment (VE) 
consisting of a courtyard surrounded by visually distinct buildings. Twenty-one 
place-holders were randomly distributed throughout the courtyard. Participants were 
initially given a familiarisation task, whereby they are able to move around the 
available viewing areas. At presentation, a list length of either, 3, 6 or 9 everyday 
objects appeared one-by-one over one of the placeholders. Following presentation, 
each image was presented with 3 foils positioned over adjacent placeholders from 
either the same-viewpoint as the presentation stage (egocentric condition) or a 
switched-view (140 degrees, allocentric condition). Participants were required to 
identify the object from the presentation stage (see appendix 4 for images of the VE 
task). The task consisted of 36 trials in total: 6 trials of the 3, 6, 9 list lengths tested 
from the same-viewpoint; and 6 trails of the 3, 6, 9 list lengths tested from the 
switched-viewpoint. 
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Intrusive imagery interview 
An intrusive imagery interview is a common method for investigating intrusive 
experiences (Brewin et al., 2010). Patel et al. (2007) employed the paradigm in a 
study investigating intrusive images and memories in major depression.  
 
Following a brief description of intrusive imagery, participants were asked to report 
2 intrusive images that had automatically and spontaneously appeared in their minds 
during the past week or during a typical week. The frequency of the images and 
whether they related to an autobiographical memory were recorded. Participants 
were asked to rate on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 100 (very much so), the extent to 
which various emotions (shame, anger, anxiety, sadness, guilt, happiness) and 
sensory details (taste, sound, olfactory, tactile, visual) accompanied the images. The 
vividness, interference with daily activities, uncontrollability, distress and sense of 
“nowness” were also rated on the same scale. “Nowness” was explained as the extent 
to which the image felt like a real event actually happening in the present. See 
appendix 5 for the intrusive imagery interview schedule. 
 
The shortened version of the Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and 
Experiences (O-Life(s); Mason, Linney & Claridge, 2005) 
The short form of the O-LIFE questionnaire was used to assess psychosis-proneness. 
This measure yields four factors: Unusual Experiences (O-LIFE_UE: An analogue of 
positive symptoms of schizophrenia, including hallucinations); Cognitive 
Disorganisation (O-LIFE_CD: Corresponds to thought disorder); Introvertive 
Anhedonia (OLIFE_IA: Negative symptoms of schizophrenia); and Impulsive Non-
conformity (O-LIFE_IN: Relates to behavioural impulsivity). The O-LIFE(s) has 
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been found to have good reliability, content validity and concurrent validity (Mason, 
Linney & Claridge, 2005). In order to maintain reliability, the whole questionnaire 
was used. However, only the Unusual Experiences subscale is subsequently reported. 
 
The Revised Launay-Slade Hallucination scale (LSHS-R) (Bentall & Slade, 1985; 
Launay & Slade, 1981) 
The LSHS-R is a frequently used measure of predisposition to hallucinations in the 
general population. 12 items are scored on a five-point scale and describe either 
clinical or subclinical hallucinatory experiences. The LSHS-R has been demonstrated 
to have good reliability and validity (Aleman et al., 1999a). 
 
Spielberger’s State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, 1983) 
The STAI is a frequently used self-report measure designed to assess state and trait 
anxiety. The STAI state scale consists of 20 statements regarding current feelings of 
anxiety, rated on a 4 point scale ranging from not at all to very much so. The STAI 
trait scale consists of 20 statements regarding general anxiety and is rated on a 4-
point scale ranging from almost never to almost always. The STAI has been found to 
have good psychometric properties (Oei, Evans, & Crook, 1990). 
 
Results 
All 55 participants completed the study. Of these participants, 23 were male and 32 
were female. 31 participants identified themselves as students and 24 were non-
students. The age range of the participants was 18-52 years with a mean of 24 years, 
a median of 23 years, and a mode of 21 years. No gender, age or student status 
effects were demonstrated. 
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Preparing the data 
VE Task 
On the VE task, the same-view and switched-view conditions consisted of 3 list 
lengths (3, 6 & 9) and a total score was created for each. Preliminary analysis 
demonstrated high consistency between the scores on each separate list length. For 
parsimony, only the total scores have been included in the analysis and both met 
assumptions of normality.   
 
Hallucination-proneness measures 
The data was tested to determine whether normality assumptions were met. Both the 
LSHS-R and the O-LIFE_UE met normality assumptions. 2 participants did not 
complete the O-LIFE_UE due to an error in distributing the questionnaires. 
 
Intrusive imagery interview 
36 participants reported at least 1 intrusive image and of these, 24 reported 2 
intrusive images. Consequently, when two images were reported, the highest score 
on each variable was used. This allowed for the maximum amount of data to be used 
from all 36 participants who completed the interview. A total sensory score was 
formed by adding together the sensory scores (taste, sound, olfactory and visual). 
Due to floor effects on the frequency data, groups were created of participants with 
no imagery reports (N=19), participants with a frequency of images up to once a 
week (N=17) and more than once a week (N=19). The memory data was recorded as 
follows; neither the first or second image was reported as a memory (N=19), either 
the first or second image was a memory (N=14). Preliminary analysis demonstrated 
no effect on any of the tasks if the image was or was not reported as a memory. 
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Due to floor effects, on the intrusive image scores, the following did not meet 
assumptions of normality; frequency, sadness, happiness, guilt, shame, anger, 
anxiety, vividness, nowness, impact, distress. Transformations were attempted. 
However, these were insufficient to produce variables meeting normality 
assumptions. Consequently, non-parametric tests were employed.   
 
STAI 
The mean State anxiety score was 34 (SD=8.39) and the mean trait score was 41.28 
(SD=9.65). Preliminary analysis demonstrated no informative effects of state or trait 
anxiety on any of the tasks. 
 
Relationship between the VE task and frequency of intrusive imagery 
On a Spearman’s Rho correlation, no significant association was demonstrated 
between frequency of intrusive imagery and scores on the same-view condition 
(r(36)=-.123, p=.481) or switched-view condition (r(36)=-.214, p=.217). 
 
A one-way ANOVA was employed comparing the total switched-view scores 
between participants with no imagery (N=19), participants with a frequency of 
images up to once a week (N=17) and more than once a week (N=19). No significant 
main effect was demonstrated (F(2,55)=2.02, p=.142). On a post-hoc Tukey test, no 
differences were demonstrated between any of the groups (greatest significance was 
p=.119). There was also no main effect between the frequency groups on the same-
view condition (F(2,55)=0.976, p=.383), and no effects were demonstrated between 
any of the groups on a post-hoc Tukey test (greatest significance was p=.4). See table 
1 for a summary of the means. 
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Relationship between hallucination-proneness and frequency of intrusive 
imagery 
A one-way ANOVA compared the frequency groups and scores on the LSHS-R. The 
model demonstrated a significant main effect (F(2,55)=5.683, p=.006). Follow-up 
tests were conducted to evaluate differences between the groups. An almost 
significant difference was demonstrated between the no imagery group and the less 
than once a week group (p=.054). The difference between the no imagery group and 
the more than once a week group was significant (p=.006). No difference was 
demonstrated between the less than once a week group and more than once a week 
group (p=.714). The means are reported in table 1. 
 
A one-way ANOVA comparing frequency of images with the OLIFE_UE did not 
produce a significant main effect (F(2,53)=2.798, p=.07). However, on a post-hoc 
Tukey test there was almost a significant difference between the no imagery group 
and the more than once a week group (p=.054). Further, there was a trend for greater 
frequency of intrusive imagery to indicate greater mean scores on the OLIFE-UE 
(see table 1). 
 
Table 1 Frequency of intrusive imagery & scores on LSHS-R, O-LIFE_UE, total 
same-view & total switched-view  
 
Intrusive 
image 
frequency 
Mean total 
Switched-
view 
Mean total 
Same-view 
Mean LSHS-R Mean O-
LIFE_UE 
No Image 1.86 (0.64) 
N=19 
2.23 (0.45) 
N=19 
9.29 (5.56) 
N=19 
3.32 (2.14) 
N=19 
Up to once a 
week 
2.07 (0.45) 
N=17 
2.38 (0.25) 
N=17 
14.7 (6.96) 
N=17 
4.00 (2.55) 
N=16 
More than 
once a week 
1.67 (0.65) 
N=19 
2.21 (0.38) 
N=19 
16.47 (7.78) 
N=19 
4.74 (2.13) 
N=18 
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Associations between the VE task and the intrusive imagery interview 
The next aspect of the analysis was to compare scores on the VE task and responses 
on the intrusive imagery interview. Employing a Spearman’s Rho correlation, the 
total switched-view condition was significantly correlated in a negative direction 
with intrusive image nowness. The total same-view score was also negatively 
correlated with intrusive image nowness happiness and vividness. Using a Pearson’s 
correlation the total sensory score was negatively correlated with total switched-view 
and total same-view. See table 2 for a summary of the correlation statistics. 
 
In order to determine the independent effect of allocentric processing, a partial 
correlation was performed. When controlling for total same-view, total switched-
view was correlated with intrusive image nowness (r(36)=-.545, p=.001). However, 
no correlation was demonstrated between total switched-view and the total sensory 
score (r(36)=-.103, p=.558). When controlling for total switched-view there were no 
correlations between the total same-view condition and intrusive image nowness 
(r(36)=.147, p=.398) or total sensory (r(36)=-.166, p=.342). 
 
Spearman’s Rho correlations were employed between the VE task and items of the 
intrusive imagery interview measuring emotional valence, impact on daily 
functioning, uncontrollability, and distress. The only significant correlation was 
between the total same-view and happiness. All the correlation statistics can be 
found in table 2. 
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Table 2 Correlation between VE task and intrusive imagery interview 
 Total switch view (N=36) Total same view (N=36) 
Sad 
 
.267 .297 
Happy 
 
-.268 -.342* 
Guilt 
 
-.145 -.012 
Shame 
 
-.092 .063 
Anger 
 
.105 .136 
Anxiety 
 
-.021 .205 
Helpless 
 
.184 .259 
Vividness 
 
-.321 -.351* 
Nowness 
 
-.666** -.423* 
Impact 
 
-.289 -.094 
Uncont. 
 
.041 -.058 
Distress 
 
.124 .213 
Sensory 
 
-.354* -.374* 
**=significance < .01; *=significance < .05 
 
Associations between the VE task and hallucination-proneness 
There were no significant correlations between the VE task and LSHS-R (greatest 
significance; P=.619) or the O-LIFE_UE (greatest significance; P=.114). However, 
there is evidence for an estimated base rate of between 10% and 30% for a 
schizotypy taxon within the general population (Horan et al., 2004; Linscott & van 
Os, 2010). This is suggestive of a potential non-linear correlation between 
schizotypy and the VE task. Consequently, two groups were created in order to 
determine if participants who scored high on the OLIFE_UE would differ on VE task 
performance. The high group was cut at a point whereby a double figure N could be 
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reached, providing this was within the 10%-30% range. Thus, a high group consisted 
of scores of 6 and above (N=13), which represented 26% of the population. A low 
group consisted of participants with scores of 5 and below (N= 40). Employing an 
independent samples t test a significant difference was demonstrated between the 
groups; t(51)=2.252, p=.029. The mean switched-view score for the low O-LIFE_UE 
group was 1.99 (SD=0.57), whilst the mean score for the high O-LIFE_UE group 
was 1.57 (SD=0.59). An ANCOVA was employed, in order to determine whether the 
difference remained after controlling for the same-view condition. No main effect 
was demonstrated (F(2,53)=2.011, P=.162). No difference was also demonstrated 
between the high and low O-LIFE_UE groups on the same-view condition 
(t(51)=1.724, P=.91).  
 
Table 3 Correlations between VE task and hallucination-proneness 
 Total switch view Total same view 
LSHS-R 
 
.017 (N=55) -.068 (N=55) 
O-LIFE_UE -.242 (N=53) -.249 (N=53) 
 
**=significance < .01; *=significance < .05  
 
Associations between hallucination-proneness and intrusive imagery interview 
On a Spearman’s Rho correlation, the LSHS-R was negatively correlated with 
intrusive image sadness, anxiety and helplessness. There was a significant 
association between the OLIFE_UE and intrusive image nowness. However, when 
comparing the nowness scores with the two O-LIFE_UE groups described above, no 
significant difference was demonstrated (t(32)=-.813, p=.416). The LSHS-R was also 
not correlated with nowness. See table 4 for a full summary of the correlation 
statistics. 
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Table 4 Correlations between hallucination proneness and intrusive imagery 
interview 
 
 O-LIFE_UE 
(N=34) 
LSHS-R 
(N=36) 
Sad 
 
-.202 -.342* 
Happy 
 
-.105 -.152 
Guilt 
 
.202 .193 
Shame 
 
.213 .123 
Anger 
 
.117 -.139 
Anxiety 
 
.085 -.349* 
Helpless 
 
-.169 -.355* 
Vividness 
 
.049 .018 
Nowness 
 
.386* .006 
Impact 
 
.114 .035 
Uncont. 
 
-.056 -.026 
Distress 
 
.067 -.213 
Sensory 
 
.062 -.017 
**=significance < .01; *=significance < .05  
 
Associations between intrusive imagery variables 
Employing a Spearman’s Rho correlation intrusive imagery nowness was correlated 
with vividness, and total sensory detail. The nowness scores were not correlated with 
the emotional valence items, impact on daily events and uncontrollability. Distress 
was found to be correlated with a number of items including; sadness, guilt, shame, 
anger, anxiety and helplessness. Sensory detail was also positively correlated with 
vividness. A correlation matrix of all the variables on the intrusive imagery interview 
can be found in table 5.
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Table 5 Correlations between variables on the intrusive imagery interview (N=36) 
 
**=significance < .01; *=significance < .05
 Sad Happy Guilt Shame Anger Anxiety Helpless Vividness Nowness Impact Uncont. Distress Sensory 
Sad 
 
             
Happy 
 
-.273             
Guilt 
 
.291 -.101            
Shame 
 
.437** -.199 .695**           
Anger 
 
.550** -.57** .211 .287          
Anxiety 
 
.416* -.378* .135 .299 .51**         
Helpless 
 
.57** -.47** .107 .237 .028 .634**        
Vividness 
 
-.117 .097 .111 .04 .079 -.183 -.078       
Nowness 
 
-.232 -.014 .280 .249 .012 .275 .002 .336*      
Impact 
 
.215 -.063 .254 .345* .195 .265 .144 .156 .216     
Uncont. 
 
.211 -.244 .180 .157 .596** .186 .177 .397* .315 .266    
Distress 
 
.613** -.385* .368* .534** -.124 .54** .534** -.173 .151 .019 .251   
Sensory 
 
-.037 .1 .249 .288  .104 -.21 .389* .485** .213 .312 .022  
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Discussion 
This study sought to test predictions of the revised dual representation theory 
(Brewin et al., 2010) and an updated account of the continuum of contextual 
integration hypothesis. Accordingly, hallucinations are argued to be on an extreme 
end of a continuum with intrusive imagery. Further, in accordance with theoretical 
assumptions, weaker allocentric processing with intact egocentric processing is 
argued to underlie this relationship. The findings demonstrated some support for this 
proposed relationship but further research is recommended due to a lack of 
robustness with some of the findings. 
 
Contrary to the revised dual representation theory and previous findings (e.g. Bisby 
et al., 2010), no relationship was demonstrated between the frequency of intrusive 
imagery and egocentric and allocentric processing. However, a significant 
relationship was demonstrated between greater frequency of intrusive imagery and 
greater hallucination-proneness. This finding is congruent with an updated 
continuum of contextual integration hypothesis, and with previous research that has 
demonstrated a relationship between predisposition to the positive symptoms of 
psychosis and greater frequency of intrusive imagery (e.g. Holmes & Steel, 2004).  
However, there are two methodological issues with regard to the frequency data, 
which may explain the disparity in the findings. Firstly, participants appeared to find 
it difficult to provide an accurate response to the frequency of intrusive imagery 
question and so provided an estimate as a response (e.g. many participants 
approximated once a week). This produced the floor effects on this variable, which 
may reflect both a lack of variability in the frequency data as well as potentially a 
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lack of reliability. Secondly, the group of participants who did not report intrusive 
imagery were assumed to not experience intrusive imagery. However, it may be, for 
example, that a number of participants in this group did not want to report intrusive 
imagery with emotional content, in the absence of an appropriate therapeutic 
relationship.  
 
There was a clear and strong relationship between weaker allocentric processing 
(independent of egocentric processing) with the sense of “nowness” of intrusive 
imagery. This finding lends support to the revised dual representation theory (Brewin 
et al., 2010), in particular with regard to the presence of two independent yet 
connected systems (egocentric and allocentric) that are responsible for encoding, 
storing and retrieving memories of events. Further, in accordance with an updated 
continuum of contextual integration hypothesis, it was demonstrated that intrusive 
imagery with a greater sense of “nowness” was related to greater hallucination-
proneness.  
 
Accordingly, in explaining the findings presented above, it may be that a weaker 
allocentric system produces C-reps, which are less able to command “top-down” 
control with the corresponding S-rep. This results in S-reps which lack contextual 
(including temporal and spatial) information and which are more vulnerable to 
automatic retrieval. Further along a weaker allocentric continuum, the more the 
intrusive image is experienced as happening in the present, the more likely it is that 
this experience of consciousness will be interpreted as hallucinatory. However, it 
should be noted that the relationship between hallucination-proneness and the sense 
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of “nowness” of intrusive imagery was only demonstrated on one of the two 
hallucination-proneness scales. 
 
Additionally, a significant number of the intrusive images were not reported as being 
related to a memory of an event. This implies that the allocentric and egocentric 
systems may be involved in the development of unconscious, imagined, yet intrusive 
autobiographical scenes, as well as the processing of real events. This may have 
further implications for understanding hallucinatory experiences, which are 
essentially intrusive, perceptual events experienced in the absence of appropriate 
stimuli (Slade & Bentall, 1988).  
  
Accordingly, the results demonstrated that both egocentric and allocetric processing 
systems might be involved in the development of the sensory detail of intrusive 
imagery. This finding is interesting considering the high level of hallucinatory-type 
experiences, and in particular voice-hearing experiences, that are often reported by 
individuals with a trauma history (e.g. Brewin & Patel, 2010). The results did not 
identify independent effects of allocentric and egocenric processing with the sensory 
detail of intrusive imagery. However, this is not necessarily unexpected. The revised 
dual representation theory (Brewin et al., 2010) would predict that the sensory detail 
of intrusive images are coded by the egocentric system, whilst the allocentric system 
is responsible for providing context to this experience and controlling automatic 
retrieval. Regarding the VE paradigm, it is possible that with the same-view 
condition, participants could employ either allocentric or egocentric memory to solve 
the task, whereas with the switched-view, only the allocentric memory could be used. 
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Consequently, a purer test of egocentric processing might allow for more precise 
testing of the relationship between the sensory detail of intrusive imagery and 
egocentric and allocentric processing. 
 
Despite the findings presented above, the data did not demonstrate any correlations 
between allocentric and egocentric processing with hallucination-proneness. 
However, as there is some evidence suggesting an estimated base rate of between 
10% and 30% for a schizotypy taxon within the general population (e.g. Horan et al., 
2004; Linscott & van Os, 2010), a high and low hallucination-proneness group was 
formed. Accordingly, it was demonstrated that the high hallucination-proneness 
group performed significantly worse on the allocentric condition than the low 
hallucination-proneness group. However, this difference did not remain when 
controlling for egocentric processing. Further, as this was not an a priori condition 
and the size of the groups were very different, only tentative conclusions can be 
made. Nevertheless, the findings suggest that weak allocentric processing may be 
involved in the development of hallucinations, but only in the more extreme cases. 
Further, according to the results of this study, this effect was not independent of 
egocentric processing. Theoretically, this might be expected, as hallucinations are 
experienced as sensory perceptions, and S-reps are believed to code sensory details.  
 
An unusual finding was the absence of a relationship between the emotional valence, 
vividness or uncontrollability items of the intrusive imagery interview and scores on 
the information-processing task. It is possible that the floor effects on the emotional 
valence items may have contributed to the absence of a finding. Regarding the 
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vividness and uncontrollability data, an alternative scale (e.g. a likert scale) might 
have helped participants report more variable data for these variables.  The final 
group of findings relates to the relationships between the variables on the intrusive 
imagery interview. The variables measuring the sense of “nowness”, sensory detail 
and vividness were all positively correlated with each other. Distress was also 
correlated with most of the emotional valence items. Consequently, distress appears 
to be an important variable to include within this paradigm. 
 
A pathway to hallucinatory experiences 
The findings of this study lend some support to the revised dual representation theory 
(Brewin et al., 2010) and an updated continuum of contextual integration hypothesis. 
Accordingly, a weaker “baseline” allocentric system results in C-reps less able to 
command “top down” control, which leaves S-reps vulnerable to automatic retrieval. 
The resulting intrusive images have a greater sense of “nowness” because the C-rep 
is providing fewer details of context, such as time and space. According to the results 
of this study and in line with an updated continuum of contextual integration 
hypothesis, these intrusive images that have strong sensory elements and are 
experienced as real events may explain hallucinatory experiences demonstrated in 
individuals with a PTSD diagnosis and in the more extreme cases, hallucinations 
more congruent with a psychosis diagnosis. Indeed, lending inductive support to this 
hypothesis, only two participants identified themselves as having heard voices on the 
hallucination-proneness scale. Both of these participants reported very weak scores 
on the allocentric task and very high scores on the variables of the intrusive imagery 
interview.   
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However, these conclusions need to be evaluated in the context of a lack of 
robustness with some of the findings. Firstly, there were inconsistencies between the 
two hallucination-proneness measures with regard to the frequency of intrusive 
imagery, and sense of “nowness” of intrusive imagery. Secondly, although results 
demonstrated that the group with more extreme hallucination-proneness had reduced 
allocentric encoding, this was not an a priori condition, and so may represent a false 
positive. Thirdly, no hypothesised relationships were demonstrated between the 
frequency and emotional valence items of intrusive imagery with egocentric and 
allocentric processing. However, this may have been due to the floor effects 
demonstrated on these items. 
 
Clinical implications 
This study lends further support to the revised dual representation theory (Brewin et 
al., 2010), which outlines two systems responsible for the encoding of traumatic 
autobiographic events and the development of intrusive imagery. The study also 
provided some support to an updated continuum of contextual integration hypothesis. 
Accordingly, the study has implications for understanding the development of 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), whereby intrusive re-experiencing symptoms 
are the sine qua non of the condition. Furthermore, the findings have implications for 
understanding hallucinations demonstrated in individuals diagnosed with a psychotic 
disorder and in other psychological and physical disorders.  
 
It is widely reported that hearing voices and other psychotic experiences are common 
in individuals with a trauma history, and dissociative mechanisms have been argued 
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to underlie this process (Brewin & Patel, 2010; Kilcommons et al., 2008). Akin to 
dissociative theories, the revised dual representation theory outlines the peri-
traumatic processing and associated neurobiological mechanisms that occur in 
response to heightened stress. The results of this study suggest that individuals with 
relatively weaker “baseline” allocentric abilities may be more vulnerable to this 
process, resulting in intrusions with greater sensory attributes.  
 
Consequently, this has implications for therapeutic work with individuals diagnosed 
with PTSD. Firstly, normalising sensory, hallucinatory-type experiences as an 
understandable posttraumatic response might be a helpful, therapeutic aspect of an 
intervention. Secondly, therapies which seek to integrate the trauma memory with its 
appropriate contextual counterpart may help to alleviate the experience of “current 
threat” (Ehlers & Clark, 2000), as well as the sensory, hallucinatory-type 
experiences, which are invariably linked. 
 
There are also evident implications for individuals diagnosed with a psychotic 
disorder. It may be that for many individuals diagnosed with a psychotic disorder, 
hallucinations represent extreme traumatic flashbacks, which contain highly sensory-
laden information. In accordance with this, Read and Argyle (1999) demonstrated 
that the content of hallucinations in individuals with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, 
matched concrete details of childhood, physical and sexual abuse. Further, Beck and 
Van de Kolk (1987) identified that sexual delusions were common in incest 
survivors. Consequently, given the prevalence of trauma in psychotic populations 
(Read et al., 2005), assessment of psychotic experiences should invariably involve a 
! "#!
full history with a focus on traumatic experiences. However, it should be noted that 
in accordance with the theory (e.g. Brewin et al., 2010), the details of traumatic 
events might be difficult to recall verbally, especially in the absence of appropriate 
therapeutic conditions. 
 
The current study also demonstrated how intrusive images that are not memories of 
autobiographic, traumatic events can also contain the sense of “nowness” and 
sensory attributes, in individuals with appropriate information processing styles. 
Consequently, traumatic events may be an important, but not an altogether necessary 
condition for the development of hallucinations. In these instances, it is possible that 
a weak allocentric system and intact egocentric system may create the conditions for 
intrusive hallucinatory-type experiences. 
 
In line with this, Mayhew and Gilbert (2008) demonstrated very positive results 
employing compassionate mind training (CMT) with a group of chronic malevolent 
voice-hearers. CMT is aimed at self-soothing and inhibiting the stress-response 
system. Accordingly, this approach may serve to inhibit activation of S-reps 
contained within the egocentric system. Alongside such an approach, therapies that 
seek to strengthen the allocentric system, which would create C-reps capable of 
commanding “top-down” control on S-reps, may also be beneficial. For example, 
Morrison (2004) employed an imagery reliving and re-scripting therapy with a man 
with psychosis and demonstrated positive results. 
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Furthermore, hallucinations have been demonstrated in a range of physical disorders 
(Assad & Shapiro, 1986). Consequently, the approaches detailed above may be 
beneficial in helping individuals distressed by hallucinations more widely.  
 
Future research 
It is important to replicate the study with the addition of a purer test of egocentric 
processing. This would allow for more precise testing of the revised dual 
representation theory (Brewin et al., 2010) and its relation to intrusive imagery and 
psychotic experiences. In addition, it would perhaps be more reliable to use a likert 
scale on a number of the variables of the intrusive imagery paradigm including, 
frequency and emotional valence. 
 
There was some suggestion of more extreme cases on the Unusual Experiences scale 
of the O-LIFE demonstrating significantly poorer allocentric processing. 
Furthermore, two participants who reported hearing voices on the LSHS-R 
demonstrated the lowest score on the allocentric condition of the VE task and had 
exceptionally high scores on the intrusive imagery interview. Therefore, it would be 
important to replicate the study employing a screening measure to include a group of 
voice-hearers in the general population. The paradigm could also be replicated in 
both a traumatised and/or psychotic clinical populations. 
 
Limitations  
Design 
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The study employed a one-group, cross-sectional design. This means that 
associations can be identified but causality cannot be determined. The study also 
employed an analogue design, sampling from a research pool of students and adult 
participants. Despite evidence for a continuum approach to psychotic experiences 
(Claridge, 1987), this does limit the external and ecological validity of the findings, 
in particular to clinical populations in naturalistic environments.  
 
Statistical considerations 
Through analysing the data a number of correlations were used with no corrections 
made for chance significance, thus increasing Type 1 error probability. However, 
with this in mind it was vital to have clear hypotheses from the outset and the 
findings represent a pathway towards further research rather than an endpoint.   
 
Intrusive Interview schedule  
There were a number of different ways the intrusive imagery data could be analysed. 
Due to the high consistency between the first image and the highest scores and for 
reasons of parsimony, it was decided that only the highest imagery scores would be 
reported. It is recognised that this means that scores do not represent participants’ 
reports of their experiences of an individual intrusive image, however, it may 
represent an individual’s “intrusive imagery potential”. Nevertheless, this method of 
analysing the intrusive imagery data does represent a potential validity issue.  
 
The interview schedule was based on Patel et al. (2007), who demonstrated it as a 
reliable way of assessing intrusive experiences. However, in neither the current 
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study, nor Patel et al. (2007), was the interview schedule formally assessed for 
properties of reliability and validity. Moreover, concerns have been highlighted with 
regard to the reliability of introspective reports (Aleman et al., 1999a). For example, 
it has been demonstrated that some individuals may demonstrate a tendency to 
endorse odd items within an experimental paradigm (e.g. Merckelbach & van de 
Ven, 2001). As such, it is unknown to what extent reports on the interview represent 
adherence to perceived demand characteristics of the experiment. However, asking 
individuals to report the content of their imagery may have counteracted this process. 
Alternative methods to assess intrusive imagery could include screening for 
participants with intrusive imagery or using the trauma film paradigm, which has 
been used in previous studies (e.g. Bisby et at., 2010). 
 
VE Task 
The task took approximately 45 minutes to 1 hour to complete and required steady 
concentration throughout this time. Factors that may have affected performance 
include motivation, attention and fatigue. In particular, the switched-view condition 
requires additional attention and this may have been a factor in addition to contextual 
processing abilities affecting performance.  However, the task has been used in a 
number of studies and consistently been demonstrated as a valid and reliable tool for 
assessing contextual processing (e.g. Bisby et al., 2010). Moreover, from an 
observational perspective, participants appeared on the whole engaged and motivated 
to do well on the task. 
 
Hallucination-proneness measures 
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The hallucination-proneness measures used in this study were the LSHS-R and the 
O-LIFE(s). They are based on the assumption that hallucinatory and other psychotic 
experiences exist on a continuum within the general population (Claridge, 1987). 
Regarding hallucinatory experiences, one factor demonstrated to exist within the 
measures is vivid imagery/daydreams (Waters, Badcock & Maybery, 2003). 
However, empirical evidence has not reached a consensus that vivid volitional 
imagery is in any way related to hallucinatory experiences (Bentall, 1990). 
Therefore, the measures may lack some construct validity with regard to assessing a 
“true” continuum of hallucinatory experiences. Similarly, another factor 
demonstrated to exist within the measures is intrusive imagery (Waters, Badcock & 
Maybery, 2003). Consequently, the measures may also lack sensitivity to 
differentiate between intrusive imagery and hallucinations.  
 
Conclusions and summary 
This study aimed to test the revised dual representation theory (Brewin et al., 2010) 
and an updated version of the contextual integration hypothesis. More specifically, it 
was the first study to investigate the relationship between the properties of intrusive 
imagery and egocentric versus allocentric processing. Further, this was the first study 
identified to investigate a relationship between hallucinations and egocentric versus 
allocentric processing.  
 
In support of the revised dual representation theory (Brewin et al., 2010), it was 
demonstrated that weaker allocentric processing independent of egocentric 
processing was associated with a greater sense of “nowness” of intrusive imagery. 
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The sensory component of the images was related to both information processing 
systems but further research is required to confirm the nature of this relationship. 
However, the findings relating to the frequency of intrusive images did not support 
the revised dual representation theory. 
 
In line with an updated continuum of contextual integration hypothesis, greater 
hallucination-proneness was related to greater frequency of intrusive imagery, and 
intrusive imagery with a greater sense of “nowness”. There was also some evidence 
suggesting that more extreme hallucination-proneness was associated with weaker 
allocentric processing abilities. However, further support is required to confirm this 
hypothesis.  
 
Further research employing more extreme cases of hallucinatory-type experiences in 
the general population or in clinical populations is recommended to identify further 
support for a relationship between hallucinations and intrusive imagery, and the 
information processing styles that may underlie this relationship. 
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Introduction 
This critical appraisal of the research process is focussed on 3 broad areas. Firstly, in 
order to provide some context to the research, I present some of the key reasons 
underlying the selection of topic. Secondly, I discuss two theoretical assumptions 
underpinning the research: The continuum approach to psychosis; and traumatic 
experiences as a contributing factor to psychosis. Thirdly, I discuss practical and 
conceptual issues related to measuring hallucinations and intrusive imagery. I end 
with a summary and final reflections on the research process. 
 
Selection of topic 
In 2003, I undertook my undergraduate research on attribution biases in paranoia at 
the University of Manchester. Consequently, my views on psychosis were, at the 
time, very much situated in the idea that psychotic experiences are part of a 
continuum of “normal” psychological processes. This work greatly influenced my 
interest in undertaking critical, yet empirical research in general, and in particular on 
the broad area of psychosis.  
 
Upon selecting a topic for my doctoral research, I was keen to further build on my 
knowledge and experience of psychosis research, in order to further contribute to a 
psychological understanding of psychotic experiences. It was through both psychosis 
training and my experiences on clinical placements that influenced my selection of 
topic. 
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Whilst on placement in a community mental health team (CMHT), I attended a ward 
round at the local psychiatric inpatient unit. One of the patients seen at the ward 
round was a young male who had experienced a paranoid breakdown after starting at 
university. Upon reading his file, I was struck by his history of living in multiple care 
homes and pervasive experiences of childhood sexual abuse. Perhaps naively at the 
time, I was astonished that the team did not deem this information relevant, and it 
was clear from the discussion that his psychotic experiences were understood as part 
of a biologically based, genetic brain disorder. Another patient discussed in the ward 
round was a woman with delusions of being poisoned and she thus was refusing anti-
psychotic medication. Without irony, it was agreed that the medication should be 
covertly hidden in her food.  
 
As a first-year trainee clinical psychologist in the first few weeks of training, I can 
recall the paralysing sense of powerlessness I felt in being unable to shift a discourse 
dominated by a medical and paternal view of distress and psychotic experiences. 
From a psychodynamic perspective it could also be argued that I was identifying 
with the powerlessness experienced by the patients (Lemma, 2003).  
 
Almost simultaneously, at university we had a series of teaching sessions on 
psychosis. One in particular focussed on the impact of trauma on psychotic 
symptoms and introduced the work of various researchers including, Anthony 
Morrison, John Read, and Craig Steel. The idea that large proportions of those 
diagnosed with a psychotic illness have experienced childhood traumatic 
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experiences, very much resonated with my experience on placement and my 
assumptions about psychosis.  
 
Through further reading and discussion, I became interested in the idea of a 
convergence between posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and psychosis, and in 
particular, the idea that psychosis might even be best understood as a complex 
trauma reaction (Read et al., 2005). Despite much evidence of the high prevalence of 
trauma in psychotic populations (e.g. Janssen et al., 2004) and conversely, the high 
prevalence of psychotic experiences in traumatised individuals (Brewin & Patel, 
2010), a clear understanding of this relationship seemed to be in its infancy. As such, 
researching the psychological mechanisms that might mediate a relationship between 
trauma and psychosis appeared to be an important and vibrant area for research. 
 
My interest in the continuum approach to psychosis influenced my desire to carry out 
analogue research on a general population sample. Through reading the work of 
Craig Steel (e.g. Steel, Fowler & Holmes, 2005) as well as the psychological 
research on PTSD (e.g. Brewin et al., 2010), I selected to study the mechanisms 
underlying intrusive imagery and how these might theoretically influence psychotic 
experiences. 
 
Underlying theoretical assumptions of the research 
The research process consisted of undertaking a literature review on hallucinations 
and mental imagery, as well as carrying out the aforementioned research on 
contextual processing, intrusive imagery and hallucination-proneness. Underpinning 
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the research were two theoretical assumptions: Firstly, the notion that psychotic 
experiences exist on a continuum throughout the population; secondly, that trauma is 
often a causal factor underpinning psychotic experiences. As such, experiences such 
as hallucinations and delusions are viewed as people’s best attempts to understand 
their world and experiences of consciousness. Therefore, as these ideas sit in 
opposition to a medical, categorical approach to psychosis, the research takes a 
critical stance towards the diagnostic construct of schizophrenia and related 
psychotic disorders.  
 
The continuum approach to psychosis 
Both the literature review and the empirical research were situated within a 
continuum approach to psychosis and/or psychotic experiences. The continuum 
approach argues that psychotic experiences exist on a continuum from mild forms in 
the general population to clinical features that warrant intervention. More 
specifically, “schizotypy”, “psychotic experiences” and “psychosis-proneness” are 
based on the view that the psychosis phenotype is expressed at levels well below its 
clinical manifestation. In a recent review of epidemiological studies, van Os et al. 
(2009) demonstrated that high proportions of individuals in the general population 
endorse symptoms akin to hallucinations and delusions. Further, the Dunedin cohort 
study (Poulten et al., 2000) found that adolescents frequently endorsed hallucinatory-
type experiences.  
 
Contrary to these findings, a latent categorical class has been demonstrated with 
regard to psychotic experiences (Horan et al., 2004; Linscott & van Os, 2010). That 
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is, there is some evidence suggesting a continuum and other evidence suggesting a 
discontinuous cut-off at the extreme end of the distribution.  However, it has been 
pointed out that research investigating the epidemiology of psychosis is beset by 
methodical flaws (Linscott & van Os, 2010). 
 
Despite the empirical research being situated within a “pure” continuum approach, 
the results provided some evidence (albeit post-hoc) to back-up the proposal of a 
discontinuous cut-off at the extreme end. Consequently, it may be that there exists an 
inherent vulnerability that makes some people more prone to a psychotic breakdown. 
Unlike theorists and clinicians who operate within a neo-Kraeplinian paradigm, this 
does not necessarily point to a vulnerability to schizophrenia, bipolar or psychosis 
per se. For example, a stress-reactivity vulnerability model has been proposed, 
whereby some people may be more prone to a heightened biological and 
psychological response to life stressors (Myin-Germeys & van Os, 2007). 
 
Regardless of the evidence of either the continuum approach or a discontinuous cut-
off theory of psychotic experiences, the dominant discourse is one situated within a 
categorical approach. Indeed, Linscott and van Os (2010) highlighted that, “there is a 
huge divide between findings formulated in contemporary theories of schizophrenia 
and the (nonevidence-based) way psychosis is conceptualised in DSM” (p.413). 
Consequently, this area of research is vital in order to affect institution and 
systematic change, in line with contemporary evidence. 
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Moreover, the difference between a categorical approach as advocated by the DSM 
and ICD as opposed to a continuous one, is crucially important. Accordingly, a latent 
categorical assumption can have dramatic implications for individuals diagnosed 
with a psychotic disorder. For example, clinicians operating within a categorical 
model may be more likely to ignore patients’ preferences about treatment, sanction 
forced treatments, and trivialise contextual influences on an individual’s experience 
(Bentall, 2009). Furthermore, a categorical (neo-Kraplinian) view has also been 
demonstrated to increase stigma, prejudice, fear and a desire for distance (Read et al., 
2006). However, it has been argued that the lack of an alternative and the clinical 
utility of the existing categorical system, are strong reasons to maintain the current 
categorical approach (Lawrie et al., 2010). 
 
In sum, investigating underlying assumptions of psychotic experiences is vitally 
important, as this can have dramatic effects on the treatment of those diagnosed with 
a psychotic disorder. The research process has highlighted the complexities of the 
continuum approach. In particular, despite initial assumptions of a “pure” continuum, 
it may be that there exists a cut-off at the extreme end. Consequently, continued 
research and discussion is important in order for contemporary empirical findings to 
affect clinical reality.  
 
Trauma and psychosis 
There exists now a great deal of empirical evidence supporting the thesis that 
childhood traumatic experiences are a cause or contributing factor to the 
development of psychotic experiences (Read, Hammersley & Rudegeair, 2007). This 
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has created a paradigm shift and opened up new avenues for research and clinical 
interventions. Prior to this work, the life experiences of individuals diagnosed with a 
psychotic disorder were deemed irrelevant, as were the idiosyncratic meanings of 
psychotic experiences (Hammersley et al., 2007). 
 
It is well known that traumatic experiences can result in intrusive re-experiencing of 
distinct moments of the trauma (Grey, Holmes & Brewin, 2001). Through the 
empirical research, I argued that the two information processing systems (allocentric 
and egocentric) involved in this, might exist on a continuum, with weaker allocentric 
capabilities resulting in hallucinatory-type intrusions. Drawing on an updated 
continuum of contextual integration hypothesis presented in the empirical paper, it is 
possible that continued traumatic events in childhood, such as childhood abuse or 
bullying at school, could continue to cumulatively weaken the allocentric processing 
system or the connections between the allocentric and egocentric processing systems. 
Consequently, this could result in a stream of intrusive, hallucinatory type material 
intruding into conscious awareness.  
 
Interestingly, this hypothesis compliments some of the neurobiological findings in 
adults with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. The egocentric system is believed to be 
connected to body state and emotion areas, such as the insula and amygdala (Burgess 
et al., 2001; Byrne, Becker & Burgess, 2007), and the allocentric system is 
understood to be supported by the medial temporal lobe and hippocampus (Burgess 
et al., 2001; Byrne, Becker & Burgess, 2007). Accordingly, the updated continuum 
of contextual integration hypothesis would predict that individuals with a diagnosis 
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of schizophrenia would exhibit heightened amygdala and reduced hippocampal 
functioning. Congruent with these hypotheses, individuals with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia have been demonstrated to exhibit hyper-activation of the 
hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis and reduced volume in the hippocampus 
(Walker & DiForio, 1997).  
 
However, the empirical study also suggested that traumatic memories and trauma per 
se might be an important, but not altogether necessary condition for the development 
of intrusive imagery and hallucinations. Similarly, despite evidence for significant 
proportions of psychotic populations having experienced traumatic events, some 
have not. However, rather than “obvious” traumatic events, which people are able to 
recall, it may be that experiences of early care giving have similar psychological and 
neurobiological effects. Indeed, congruent with this hypothesis, it has been 
demonstrated that early care giving experiences (or lack of) have permanent effects 
on the stress response system of the developing brain (Gerhardt, 2004). That is, a 
baby who is often left to cry in pain may develop a heightened stress-response 
system.  
 
In support, Read et al., (2001), presented a “traumagenic neurodevelopmental” 
model to describe how events early in life might affect the developing brain in terms 
of heightened stress sensitivity. As such, the authors argued that the diathesis in a 
diathesis-stress model of psychosis might be poor early care giving or traumatic 
experiences, rather than assumed biological or genetic vulnerabilities. In line with an 
updated continuum of contextual integration hypothesis, it would be predicted that 
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this would create the conditions for an intact or heightened egocentric system and 
weak allocentric processing system. Consequently, an individual would be highly 
sensitive to stress, and as such, even mild stressful events could create the conditions 
for hallucinatory type experiences. However, evidently with such a hypothesis, 
additional factors are likely to be involved. This is because many individuals with 
inadequate care giving experiences often progress to receive a diagnosis of non-
psychotic disorders, such as borderline personality disorder, rather than psychosis 
(Fonagy et al., 2003).   
 
Providing some support to the updated continuum of contextual integration 
hypothesis, the two participants who reported hearing voices on the predisposition to 
hallucination scale, also scored very poorly on the allocentric condition of the 
information processing task, and had very high scores on the intrusive imagery 
paradigm. In light of the above, it would be interesting to investigate the early care 
giving experiences of these participants, and/or their experiences of traumatic or 
stressful events throughout their life.  
 
Nevertheless, the updated continuum of contextual integration hypothesis and some 
of the hypotheses presented above, highlight two strands of possible interventions for 
people distressed by psychotic experiences. Firstly, interventions drawing on trauma 
focussed cognitive therapy (Ehlers & Clark, 2000), which was demonstrated as 
effective in a single case study with a man with a diagnosis of schizophrenia 
(Morrison, 2004). This therapy could be employed for individuals whereby psychotic 
symptoms are related to traumatic experiences. However, the same intervention 
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might also be effective for psychotic experiences not related to traumatic incidents. 
For example, this could involve focussing on a malevolent voice and simultaneously 
providing a verbal narrative, which includes details of context. This might help to 
integrate the C-rep with the S-rep intrusion, thus reducing automatic retrieval. 
Secondly, running parallel with a trauma-focussed intervention could be a 
compassionate mind therapy (CMT), which was demonstrated as effective in 
reducing the frequency of malevolent voices (Mayhew & Gilbert, 2008). As such, 
CMT could help to reduce the activation of S-reps through self-soothing, whilst a 
trauma-focussed intervention could strengthen the C-reps, thus providing greater 
“top down” control. 
 
In sum, despite initial assumptions of a link between trauma and psychosis, the 
research process has highlighted that although trauma is important and prevalent in 
psychotic populations, it may not be necessary for the development of psychotic 
experiences. However, similar information-processing systems and associated neuro-
biological mechanisms might be involved in both types of psychotic experiences, 
thus indicating a rationale for employing trauma focussed cognitive therapy and 
compassionate mind therapy. 
 
Practical and conceptual issues of measurement 
In some respects, the relationship between intrusive imagery and hallucinations 
might be argued to be tautological. Indeed, conceptually, both intrusive imagery and 
hallucinations have been argued to form part of the same construct. For example, 
Morrison (2001) argued that the difference between hallucinations and intrusive 
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imagery is in the interpretation. An example may be hearing a voice and interpreting 
it as the voice of an abuser, versus interpreting it as the voice of the devil. These 
interpretations of the same cognitive experience are likely to result in drastically 
different consequences and diagnoses by professionals. Similarly, the current 
empirical study was positioned within the assumption that a hallucination is on an 
extreme end of an intrusive imagery continuum. Accordingly, to tease apart these 
constructs within research paradigms is fraught with difficulties.  
 
The literature review highlighted some of the difficulties that researchers have faced 
when trying to test the relationship between intrusive imagery and hallucinations. For 
example, Aleman, Bocker and de Haan (1999) argued against the use of introspective 
reports by demonstrating contradictory findings between “objective” and 
“subjective” measures of mental imagery. Further, Merkelbach and van de Ven 
(2001) demonstrated that for some individuals, responses on introspective reports 
might represent a response bias to endorse odd items.    
 
The psychosis-proneness measures used in the empirical study were the LSHS-R 
(Bentall & Slade, 1985; Launay & Slade, 1981) and the O-LIFE(s) (Mason, Linney 
& Claridge, 2005). They are based on the assumption that hallucinatory and other 
psychotic experiences exist on a continuum within the general population (Claridge, 
1987). Regarding hallucinatory experiences, one factor demonstrated to exist within 
the measures is vivid imagery/daydreams (Waters, Badcock & Maybery, 2003). 
However, empirical evidence has not reached a consensus that vivid volitional 
imagery is in any way related to hallucinatory experiences (Bentall, 1990). 
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Therefore, the measures may lack some construct validity with regard to assessing a 
“true” continuum of hallucinatory experiences. Similarly, another factor 
demonstrated to exist within the measures is intrusive imagery (Waters, Badcock & 
Maybery, 2003). Consequently, the measures may also lack sensitivity to 
differentiate between intrusive imagery and hallucinations.  
 
In order to pragmatically move beyond these issues, some conceptual clarity is 
required. Indeed, Pierre (2009) suggested we have to be very careful when we “name 
names” (p. 1578). It is often assumed that because we call something a hallucination, 
then it is a hallucination, and that it is the same construct as something else that we 
call a hallucination. However, it has been established that hallucinations are not 
homogenous (Jones, 2010). Therefore, intrusive imagery might be on a continuum 
with one type of hallucination but unrelated to another type. For example, some 
researchers have proposed that hallucinations represent a form of inner speech 
(mis)attributed to an external source (Seal, Aleman & Mcguire, 2004). Such inner 
speech might be related to one type of hallucination, whereas intrusive imagery 
might be related to another. Therefore, it would be important to clarify different 
types of hallucinations and how these relate to intrusive imagery. 
 
With regard to future investigations in the area of intrusive imagery and 
hallucinations, if employing an analogue design, it might be more useful to screen for 
individuals who have had hallucinatory experiences. This would satisfy the literature 
regarding a discontinuous cut-off that may exist within the schizotypy continuum. 
Further, screening for hallucinatory experiences might allow for a more valid and 
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reliable method for investigating the relationship between hallucinatory experiences 
and intrusive imagery.  
 
Summary and final reflections on the research process 
The research process has highlighted the conceptual complexity that is involved 
when developing and testing theories of psychological difficulties. As discussed, the 
research was positioned within an assumed continuum approach to psychotic 
experiences. However, the empirical study, in addition to findings from the literature, 
has demonstrated some evidence for a cut-off at the extreme end of a continuum. 
Consequently, investigating more extreme cases within an analogue paradigm might 
be warranted, as well as investigating factors that might underlie this cut-off. 
Certainly, continued thought and empirical research within this area is necessary due 
to the implications of a categorical approach.  
 
Moreover, as discussed, preconceived ideas about the impact of trauma on psychosis 
have also shifted as a result of the research process. Traumatic experiences such as 
childhood sexual abuse have been demonstrated to be important and crucial factors 
in why many people become diagnosed as psychotic. However, it may be that similar 
outcomes can emerge from other psychosocial factors such as unresponsive early 
care giving, which has been demonstrated to have permanent effects on the stress-
response system. As such, interventions such as trauma-focussed cognitive therapy 
and compassionate mind therapy might be helpful for individuals with distressing 
psychotic symptoms. 
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The third area of the critical appraisal concerned conceptual and practical issues 
related to measuring hallucinations and intrusive imagery. The importance of 
clarifying different types of hallucinations and how these relate to intrusive imagery 
was discussed. Further, employing an analogue design, screening for hallucinatory 
experiences might allow for a more valid and reliable method for investigating the 
relationship between hallucinatory experiences and intrusive imagery.  
 
The research process has highlighted the importance of critiquing taken for granted 
conceptual and theoretic assumptions. I believe this questioning and reflexive stance 
is vital to the practice of a clinical psychologist within both clinical and research 
domains. Accordingly, Donovan (2003) highlights the importance of “stepping into 
the generic waters of uncertainty from time to time” (p.122). As such, the theoretical 
assumptions underpinning the empirical research, as well as the ideas presented in 
this critical appraisal, represent a pathway towards continued thought and research, 
rather than an endpoint. 
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Intrusive Imagery Interview Schedule 
 
 
I’m going to ask you some questions on your experience of intrusive imagery. 
Intrusive images are images that automatically pop into your head. They may consist 
of memories from the past, represent a fantasy about the future or just be an 
imaginary scene. Unlike normal thoughts and images that we may conjure up, 
intrusive images automatically pop into our head. Do you have any questions? Do 
you understand? 
 
 
Can you report any spontaneous intrusive images that have automatically appeared 
into your mind during the past week? (if no, what about during a typical week?). 
 
We are going to explore two of the most frequent intrusions. Can you briefly 
describe these: 
1. 
 
2. 
 
Do these intrusions relate to a memory of an event? 
 
If so can you describe the events? 
 
 
Intrusion 1. 
 
1. How many times over the past week did it occur? 
 
2. Rate from 0 (not at all) to 100 (very much so) the extent to which this 
intrusive image made you feel sad. 
 
3. Rate from 0 (not at all) to 100 (very much so) the extent to which this 
intrusive image made you feel happy. 
 
4. Rate from 0 (not at all) to 100 (very much so) the extent to which this 
intrusive image made you feel guilty. 
 
5. Rate from 0 (not at all) to 100 (very much so) the extent to which this 
intrusive image made you feel ashamed. 
 
6. Rate from 0 (not at all) to 100 (very much so) the extent to which this 
intrusive image made you feel angry. 
 
7. Rate from 0 (not at all) to 100 (very much so) the extent to which this 
intrusive image made you feel anxious. 
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8. Rate from 0 (not at all) to 100 (very much so) the extent to which this 
intrusive image made you feel helpless. 
 
9. Rate from 0 (very hazy) to 100 (very clear and vivid) how vivid the intrusive 
image was. 
 
10. Rate from 0 (not at all) to 100 (very much so) the sense of “nowness” of the 
intrusive image. (nowness = the extent to which it felt like the image/scene 
was actually happening in the present) 
 
11. Rate from 0 (not at all) to 100 (very much so) the impact the intrusive image 
had on daily activities. 
 
12. Rate from 0 (not at all) to 100 (very much so) how uncontrollable the 
intrusive image was. 
 
13. Rate from 0 (not at all) to 100 (very much so) how much distress the intrusive 
image caused. 
 
14. Rate from 0 (not at all) to 100 (very much so) the extent to which this 
intrusive image contained smells 
 
15. Rate from 0 (not at all) to 100 (very much so) the extent to which this 
intrusive image contained tastes. 
 
16. Rate from 0 (not at all) to 100 (very much so) the extent to which this 
intrusive image contained sounds. 
 
17. Rate from 0 (not at all) to 100 (very much so) the extent to which this 
intrusive image contained tactile sensations 
 
18. Rate from 0 (not at all) to 100 (very much so) the extent to which this 
intrusive image contained visual elements. 
 
Repeat qu’s 1-18 for the second intrusive image 
 
 
